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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
AN INVESTIGATION INTO LONG-RUN ABNORMAL RETURNS USING
PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING
This is a study in two parts. In part-1, I identify several methods of estimating
long-run abnormal returns prevalent in the finance literature and present an alterna-
tive using propensity score matching. I first demonstrate the concept with a simple
simulation using generated data. I then employ historical returns from CRSP and
randomly select events from the dataset using various alternating criteria. I test the
efficacy of different methods in terms of type-I and type-II errors in detecting abnor-
mal returns over 12- 36- and 60-month periods. I use various forms of propensity
score matching: 1 – 5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper using distance defined alterna-
tively by Propensity Scores and the Mahalanobis Metric, and Caliper Matching. I
show that overall, Propensity Score Matching with two nearest neighbors provides
much better performance than traditional methods, especially when the occurence of
events is dictated by the presence of certain firm characteristics.
In part-2, I demonstrate an application of Propensity Score Matching in the con-
text of open-market share repurchase announcements. I show that traditional meth-
ods are ill-suited for the calculation of long-run abnormal returns following such
events. Consequently, I am able to improve upon such methods on two fronts. First,
I improve upon traditional matching methods by providing better matches on multi-
ple dimensions and by being able to retain a larger sample of firms from the dataset.
Second, I am able to eliminate much of the bias inherent in the Fama-French type
methods for this particular application. I show this using simulations on samples
based on firms that resemble a typical repurchasing firm. As a result, I obtain a
statistically significant 1-, 3-, and 5-year abnormal return of about 2%, 5%, and 10%
respectively, which is much lower than what prior literature has shown using tradi-
tional methods. Further investigation revealed that much of these returns are unique
to small and unprofitable firms.
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Chapter 1
Biases in Long-Run Abnormal
Returns
1.1 Introduction
An appropriate method to calculate long-run abnormal returns is an unresolved chal-
lenge for financial research. In the past decade and a half, several methods have
been proposed and tested, ranging from the straightforward control firm approach
tested by Barber and Lyon (1997) to more complex methods like the correlation and
heteroskedasticity-consistent tests proposed by Jegadeesh and Karceski (2009). How-
ever, the methods proposed thus far are imperfect. They haven’t comprehensively
eliminated various biases that are known to exist in event samples.
In this chapter, we take a step further towards resolving this long-standing issue
by investigating the performance of propensity score matching. This method has
seen increasing acceptance in corporate finance for calculating abnormal returns in
event studies. Essentially, for firms undergoing a certain event, propensity score
matching allows us to select control firm(s) for each of these event firms on the
basis of a ‘propensity score.’ In practical applications, the probability of each firm
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participating in the event is estimated and used as the propensity score. We then
allot control firm(s), if any, to each of the event firms on the basis of the proximity
of their propensity scores. Finally, abnormal returns are calculated as the difference
between the returns of the event and their chosen controls.
While propensity score matching has been used extensively in medical and eco-
nomic studies evaluating such things as government programs, relatively few studies
have been conducted in corporate finance, where the benefits of one corporate policy
over another are often extensively discussed. Villagonga (2004) uses two matching
estimators to estimate the effect of diversification by single-segment firms on firm
value, and finds that contrary to some earlier studies, diversification on average does
not destroy value. Hogan and Lewis (2005) document changes in investment behav-
ior of firms that adopted economic profit plans by dividing firms into quartiles based
on propensity scores and find that adopters have significantly higher asset turnover
compared to non-adopoters. Cooper et al. (2005) examine the effects of mutual
fund name changes and find that funds that change their style names earn signifi-
cantly positive abnormal fund flows in the one year following the name change month.
Drucker and Puri (2005) calculate the yield spread difference between loans where
the issuer concurrently undewrites the firm’s public securities offering and noncon-
current loans and find that concurrent loans have significantly lower yield spreads.
Gande and Puri (2005) estimate ownership-restricted and non-restricted bonds and
report a significantly high estimated yield difference between the two cases. Ahn and
Walker (2007) find that diversified firms conducting a spin-off exhibit characteristics
associated with better corporate governance, as compared to a set of matched peer
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firms. Aggarwal et al. (2006) compare the governance of foreign firms to matched
U.S. firms and find that, on average, foreign firms have worse governance than U.S.
firms. C¸olak and Whited (2006) estimate whether spin-offs in conglomerate invest-
ments increase efficiency and report, using matched samples, that firms that choose
to spin-off are different from those that do not, and it is this difference that drives
the observed improvements in post spin-off efficiency. Li and Zhao (2006) examine
the performance of SEOs and find that matching issuers to non-issuers by propensity
scores eliminates any underperformance previously observed. Hellman et al. (2008)
find that companies that use relationships developed in the venture capital part of
the lending market are able to obtain future loans from these banks at lower yields
compared to nonrelationship loans. Marosi and Massoud (2008) find that cross-listed
foreign firms that deregister from the U.S. capital market have a lower percentage
of U.S. institutional investors compared to non-deregestering firms. Ivashina et al.
(2009) investigate the syndicated loan market and find that firms that are the target
of attempted takeovers (unsolicited or otherwise) have a higher number of bank-issued
loans prior to takeover compared to nontarget firms. Aggarwal et al. (2009) use a
firm’s probablity of being a foreign firm based on its characteristics as its propensity
scores and find that more than 80% of firms across the world invest less in governance
compared to a corresponding U.S. firm matched on propensity scores and industry.
Masulis et al. (2009) report agency problems at dual-class companies, finding among
other results that CEOs at dual-class companies recieve higher compensation and
their capital spending contributes less to shareholder wealth compared to single-class
companies.
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We draw an extensive comparison between propensity score matching and meth-
ods that have long been used as a favored tool in calculations of abnormal returns,
specifically the control firm approach as described in Lyon and Barber (1997), the
RATS method introduced in Ibbotson (1975), and calendar-time portfolios espoused
by Fama and French (1993). We show that the use of propensity score matching gives
us a much lower incidence of type-I errors in nonrandom samples, where firms are
clustered according to some of their underlying characteristics. At the same time,
we obtain power comparable to that of the control firm approach. We also follow a
unique approach in these tests by considering clustering along multiple characteris-
tics such as size, book-to-market ratio, and momentum simultaneously, where prior
research has mostly focused on single characteristic clustering. Given the potential
advantages of propensity score matching and the emerging use of this approach in cor-
porate finance, this chapter aims to introduce researchers to the methodology of this
technique and to evaluate its performance relative to alternate estimators of long-run
abnormal returns in different scenarios.
The rest is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a short history of the develop-
ment of the propensity score matching method. Section 3 presents a brief numerical
simulation highlighting the effectiveness of this technique over simple matching along
underlying characteristics. We then apply this technique to long-run abnormal re-
turns in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the results, and Section 6 concludes.
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1.2 History
Propensity score analysis developed fairly recently as a statistical tool to calculate
treatment effects (the expected gain due to a ‘treatment,’ for instance, a govern-
ment policy applicable to a target group) in observational studies. The concept first
appeared in a 1983 article by Rosenbaum and Rubin. Contemporary studies with
an alternate approach to resolve self-selection biases included Heckman’s (1978 and
1979) articles on resolving issues created by dummy endogenous variables using the
econometric technique of simultaneous equation modeling. Since then both these
approaches have grown substantially to this date and are used extensively to yield
unbiased estimates of treatment effects.
The evolution of experimental design accelerated with The Design of Experiments
by Fisher (1935). Prior to that the common practice in this field was to control for
as many factors as possible whenever an experiment was conducted, no doubt influ-
enced by the rather strict requirements of scientific experiments in the laboratory.
Fisher, however, noted that such a practice was both practically infeasible and often
prohibitively expensive. Instead, he proposed the (at the time) radical idea of not
controlling for any confounding factors at all and instead relying on randomization
for correct results.1 Provided that the allocation of units to treatment groups can
be randomized (using an appropriate randomization device, for instance, the rolling
1Randomized experiments were employed much earlier in the late 1800’s by Charles Peirce (1885)
among others, but Fisher provided a detailed methodology of the experimental design. In a famous
and still highly regarded experiment, eight cups of tea are prepared, four of which had the tea placed
first and the other four had milk poured first. A lady was then tested on her claim to be able to
determine using taste whether it was tea or milk that was first placed in the cups of tea. The null
hypothesis was that the lady didn’t possess the requisite skill and conclusions were drawn using
Fisher’s exact test.
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of dice) and the sample size is sufficiently large, it is possible to avoid significant
imbalances between the various groups across which the calculation of an effect is de-
sired. Following this, it then became possible to evaluate treatment effects across the
randomly assigned groups at various levels of independent (or background) variables
of interest, using the technique of matching. For example, the efficacy of a drug can
be compared to that of a placebo at various age groups.
Randomization in observational/experimental studies is more of an ideal goal not
often encountered in most situations. Heckman (1978, 1979) stressed the importance
of addressing sample selection issues in observational/experimental studies, attribut-
ing it to two major causes—self-selection by the units being investigated and sample
selection decisions by data analysts. These problems cause a bias in treatment ef-
fect estimates. For instance, while studying the effect of uninization on wages, the
observed wages for union members involves a self-selection bias because the union
members found their nonunion alternatives less desirable and chose to be part of the
union. Therefore, the wage function estimated on union members would not apply to
those from the other group. Thus, a comparison of the wages of union members with
those of nonunion workers results in a biased estimate of the effect of unionizing on
wages. Since the source of the bias is relegated to an omitted variable, the counterfac-
tual is not observed i.e., we cannot predict what wages the union members would have
earned had they not joined a union. This example illustrates the underlying problem
in causal inference in observational studies. Once a decision is made regarding the
‘treatment status’ of the individual unit, in other words which group the individual
belongs to, the outcome under the alternative scenario cannot be observed, and hence
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an accurate judgement of the treatment effect cannot be made. Heckman proposed
a model that dealt with this sample selection issue as an omitted variables bias and
accounted for this in two steps. The first step estimates the conditional probabilities
of the units receiving a particular treatment. The second step adjusts for the bias by
adding to the error term its expected value arising from the omitted variable(s). This
added term is the inverse Mills ratio calculated from the first step. Thus, the selec-
tion bias is explicitly modeled in the outcome regression. This technique contrasted
strongly against the statistical approach employed until then that treated the bias as
a balancing issue. The central underlying assumption in the latter approach is that
any variable(s) that causes a selection bias in the sample is observable. Then, the
resolution of this bias amounts to achieving a balanced set of covariates by finding an
appropriate control group for the treated units, for instance through a fine-grained
matching of the observables. In the above example, if the cause of joining a union
were observable then it could be possible to use this as one of the variables to match
on and obtain unbiased results.
Matching as a tool in experimental studies has been used as early as in Chapin
(1938), Peters (1941), and Greenwood (1945), among several others. Formal evalu-
ation of matching grew with Dorn (1953), Cochran (1953), and Greenberg (1953).
In these papers, the authors attempted to lay out a comprehensive discussion on
the proper way of selecting control groups and the subsequent matching procedure,
as well as comparing the performance of matching against regression in reducing
variance in estimated treatment effects2—albeit with very simplifying assumptions
2The standard response surfaces, i.e. the function relating the independent to the dependent
7
about the treatment and control populations. Two seminal papers appeared in 1965
that set the stage for much of the later analysis. Billewicz (1965), with the use of
an “electronic computer”, offered an empirical investigation on the performance of
matching against regression on unmatched samples for a variety of situations such
as where the underlying relationship between the dependent variable of interest and
the observed covariates ranged through linear and parallel, linear and non-parallel,
and non-linear but parallel.3 In this initial study, it was concluded that matching
in detecting treatment effects is not superior to regression on random samples, and
in fact is mostly marginally inferior. On a similar note, Cochran (1965) performed
an analytical study of different matching methods (essentially, different ways of sub-
classification) and compared it to a regression-based approach on random samples.
Here too the conclusion was that regression seemed superior to matching, although
often insubstantially. While matching had continued to be used extensively, due in
large part to the simplicity in analysis (especially when the number of covariates aren’t
many), there was no clear proof that it was superior to regression based methods for
observational studies. To this end, Rubin (1973) started empirical investigations to
test for the strength of these techniques in reducing bias inherent in the observed
variables from non-random samples. This study provided Monte Carlo results for the
expected bias in estimated treatment effects assuming different response surfaces and
un-symmetric, normally distributed covariate4 with varying sizes of the control group.
variables, considered for the treatment and control groups tended to be linear and parallel, with
symmetrical distribution in the covariates. Essentially, this meant both methods had zero bias by
design.
3For example, {Y = X1 and Y = X2}, {Y = X1 and Y = 2X2}, and {Y = X21 and Y = X22}
respectively
4Only one relevant covariate was assumed for simplicity
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Five estimates were considered: the average difference of response in the treatment
and control groups (i.e. a simple difference of means), regression-based adjustment
of bias assuming a common relationship between the treatment effect and the co-
variates for both groups, or individually for either group, and matching followed by
regression-adjustment.4 The study found that the matching procedure is especially
useful when distributions of the covariate are non-symmetric and/or their variances
are unequal between the treatment and control groups. Rubin (1979) extended this
study to include two covariates and found stronger support for the use of matching.
Thus, when the treatment and control groups are drawn from disparate population
groups, matching was found to be very handy in reducing imbalances in the observed
covariates. In hindsight, the conclusions drawn from these studies were very signifi-
cant since in the past two decades there have been a plethora of empirical studies in
both social sciences and medical research where such disparities between two groups
have been shown to be the norm, rather than the exception.
The concept of propensity scores was introduced in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983a)
as a drastic improvement over the prevailing matching techniques in calculations of
the average treatment effect. Most observational studies involve several covariates
(hereby X) and matching has exponentially increasing cost as the number of co-
variates increases—a simple quartile matching across 5 covariates gives rise to 1024
categories! The reason matching is employed is to reduce the bias arising from differ-
ent values of X in a population having different probabilities of being assigned into
4Prior studies had shown that matching followed by regression was almost always superior to
matching alone.
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a treatment group (the source of the selection bias). Assuming that X contains all
observables5 that are used in the assignment decision, matching ensures that within a
sub-class every subject has an equal probability of being treated. This in turn means
that both the treatment and control firm are randomly drawn from the same distribu-
tion,6 eliminating any potential bias. Then, for a subject with a given probability of
assignment, the assignment decision itself is independent of her characteristics (X).7
The other essential assumption in matching using sub-classes of X is that for a given
x, the treatment effect is independent of the decision to be treated8—referred to as
the strongly ignorable assumption. This assumption requires that while the treat-
ment itself may lead to a different outcome than that which would be produced by a
lack thereof, the decision to be treated shouldn’t influence the outcome. The second
important result is that if the treatment assignment is strongly ignorable conditional
on X, then it is strongly ignorable for the probability of being assigned as well. These
theorems then lead to the all-important result that conditional on the probability of
being treated (the propensity score) the expected difference in response to treatment
in a matched pair equals the average treatment effect. This lets us use matching
on propensity score (a univariate criterion) as an alternative to matching on the ob-
servables (in general a multivariate criterion), eliminating the need to match on each
individual factor that may determine an individual’s chances of recieving treatment.9
5This is implicit, but often not justified in matching studies.
6It is important to note that the objective here is to mimic the conditions of a randomized
experiment.
7Formal proof is provided in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983a)
8As discussed above, violations of this assumption are built into Heckman’s model as an omitted
variable bias.
9Furthermore, if e(x) denotes the propensity score, then if functions f and b exist such that
e(x) = f [b(x)], then b(x) (referred to as a balancing score) satisfies the properties mentioned above,
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1.3 Propensity Score Matching: A Simple Simu-
lation
In this section, we illustrate the efficacy of the propensity score matching method by
using simulated data. As mentioned earlier, the primary purpose of this method is to
estimate the treatment effect accurately by utilizing a control group to generate the
counterfactual. A simple procedure that captures the essence of the technique is as
follows:
We randomly generate a dataset of 10,000 test subjects. A quarter of the units
are randomly assigned to the treatment group. This divides the population into
two groups: Ti = 0 and Ti = 1, with Ti denoting the treatment status for unit i.
If the treatment and control groups have the same distribution of the underlying
characteristics that determine treatment and affect outcomes, then merely averaging
the outcomes across the two groups would suffice to generate the treatment effect. The
problem arises if these variables have different distributions, the reason for which is
made clear below. We let the observed X-variables be normally distributed as follows:
For the untreated group: Xj,0 = N(0, 1)
For the treated group: Xj,1 = N(dj, σj)
where, j : 1 → 5 labels the 5 independent variables, while 0 and 1 in the subscript
of X denotes being part of the control and treated groups respectively. Figure 1.1
illustrates the difference in the X-variables between the untreated and the treated
and can be used in lieu of the propensity score.
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groups for dj = 1 and σj = 1. The outcome is generated as a continuous variable:
Yi = Ti + x1,i + x2,i + x3,i + x4,i + x5,i + i
where, i N(0, σ). Therefore, the treatment effect by design is 1, as indicated by the
presence of the Ti on the right hand side of the above equation. Figure 1.2 shows
the approximate difference in the Y-variable distribution between the untreated and
treated groups using one covariate (x1)
10 with σ = 0.05. This figure signifies the effect
of bias created by including the X-variables in both the decision and the outcome
equations. The treatment effect, which should be 1, looks to be a lot higher because
higher values of X—which lead to higher values of Y—are more likely to be treated.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the same effect by plotting the Y-variable against one of the
X-variables. Evidently, the appropriate method to use in calculating treatment effect
is by looking at the vertical distance between the treatment and the treated outcomes
for each X-value and then taking the average for only those X-values that are present
in both groups. Such a method, however, is computationally infeasible for multiple
X-variables, and approximate methods used instead are unable to exclude the ‘tails’
effectively from the calculation. Therefore, merely averaging over the two groups will
give biased results. Moreover, regression-based methods don’t work either, as seen
below from attempting an OLS with a treatment dummy:
Yi = α + β0Ti + β1x1,i + β2x2,i + β3x3,i + β4x4,i + β5x5,i + i
For the untreated group:
Yi = α + β1x1,i + β2x2,i + β3x3,i + β4x4,i + β5x5,i + i
10The difference with all five covariates biased will be much more pronounced.
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E[Yi] = E[α + β1x1,i + β2x2,i + β3x3,i + β4x4,i + β5x5,i + i]
E[Yi] = α + β1E[x1,i] + β2E[x2,i] + β3E[x3,i] + β4E[x4,i] + β5E[x5,i]
Y¯T=0 = α + β1x¯1,T=0 + β2x¯2,T=0 + β3x¯3,T=0 + β4x¯4,T=0 + β5x¯5,T=0
For the treated group:
Yi = α + β0 + β1x1,i + β2x2,i + β3x3,i + β4x4,i + β5x5,i + i
E[Yi] = E[α + β0 + β1x1,i + β2x2,i + β3x3,i + β4x4,i + β5x5,i + i]
E[Yi] = α + β0 + β1E[x1,i] + β2E[x2,i] + β3E[x3,i] + β4E[x4,i] + β5E[x5,i]
Y¯T=1 = α + β0 + β1x¯1,T=1 + β2x¯2,T=1 + β3x¯3,T=1 + β4x¯4,T=1 + β5x¯5,T=1
Subtracting:
(Y¯T=1 − Y¯T=0) = β0 + β1(x¯1,T=1 − x¯1,T=0) + β2(x¯2,T=1 − x¯2,T=0)
+ β3(x¯3,T=1 − x¯3,T=0) + β4(x¯4,T=1 − x¯4,T=0) + β5(x¯5,T=1 − x¯5,T=0)
(Y¯T=1 − Y¯T=0) = β0 + β1d1 + β2d2 + β3d3 + β4d4 + β5d5
Here, the real difference between the treatment and the control groups is β0. However,
every term to the right of β0 adds to the bias, with the bias increasing as the the
difference between the means in the X-variables of the two groups (dj) increases.
Since it is practically infeasible to obtain perfectly matched treatment and control
units on all the variables, the most common method used to avoid such biases in
estimating treatment effects is a form of coarse matching, where the X-variables
are divided into quantiles and the treatment effect is calculated as the mean of the
mean difference in the outcome variables of the two groups for each quantile. The
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quantile cut-offs are estimated according to the distribution of the X-variables for
the treated units. For instance, using two variables and three quantiles, the effect
can be estimated by calculating the quantile means that are then averaged to get the
treatment effect, as shown below.
x1=low x1=mid x1=high
x2=low Y¯1,1 = (Y¯T=1 − Y¯T=0) Y¯1,2 = (Y¯T=1 − Y¯T=0) Y¯1,3 = (Y¯T=1 − Y¯T=0)
x2=mid Y¯2,1 = (Y¯T=1 − Y¯T=0) Y¯2,2 = (Y¯T=1 − Y¯T=0) Y¯2,3 = (Y¯T=1 − Y¯T=0)
x2=high Y¯3,1 = (Y¯T=1 − Y¯T=0) Y¯3,2 = (Y¯T=1 − Y¯T=0) Y¯3,3 = (Y¯T=1 − Y¯T=0)
Here, x1=low corresponds to the values of x1 in the lowest tercile of the treated
units’ distribution. The other quantiles are defined accordingly. The estimated treat-







We now show the effect of using propensity score matching on the estimated
treatment effect. Propensity scores for treatment effect using 5 covariates is calculated
according to the logistic regression:
Ti = γ + δ1x1,i + δ2x2,i + δ3x3,i + δ4x4,i + δ5x5,i + νi
Then, the average treatment effect can be determined by the average difference be-
tween the two groups based on matching on propensity scores using any of a variety of
methods. In this case we use nearest-neighbor one-to-one matching with replacement,
where each treated unit is matched to its closest neighbor (in the control group) in
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terms of the propensity score. This is the simplest possible matching method. Ta-
ble 1.1 shows the treatment effect estimates using the steps outlined above. We use
five variables to assign treatment and determine outcome (as described above), but
let the number of variables used in the estimation vary from one to five. For ordinary
matching methods, each variable is divided into two quantiles. Each cell represents
the percent bias in the treatment effect estimate. Increasing the difference in the
distribution of the X-variables across treatment and control groups (i.e. the induced
bias) is expected to increase the outcome bias when using traditional methods. This
is shown by the increasing values of the estimates using either a simple average or any
of the matching methods. We see from the last row that using all five of the relevant
variables in generating propensity scores leads to perfect results with near-zero bias,
while the quantile-matching method, which uses 32 bins when employing just two
quantiles for each variable, yields considerably poorer results. The bias arising from
the treatment and control group distributions differing by half a standard deviation
is very high at 92%. However, of greater relevance to practical studies is the compar-
ative advantage of using propensity scores even in the event of not all five of these
variables being available or known. As the difference in means of the X-variables
between the treatment and the control groups increases, the propensity score method
yields an increasingly greater advantage compared to a quantile-matching method.
However, we do notice that there is indeed a significant bias in the outcome if all
the observables are not accounted for. In the next section, we try to determine if
the gains from using propensity scores evidenced here is reflected in the context of
observed data, using long-run stock returns.
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1.4 Evaluation of Long-Run Returns
As previously noted, propensity score analysis has been used in several studies in
corporate finance to estimate long-run returns. In this section, we test this model for
misspecifications in simulated event samples. In doing so, we compare the strength
of this approach against the alternative of using control firms drawn from size and
book-to-market matched samples that have been extensively used in numerous studies
over the years.
1.4.1 Literature
Studies of long-run returns following corporate events, seeking to draw inferences
about market efficiency, have often documented the presence of abnormalities over
periods ranging from one to five years. However, such studies are twin tests of market
efficiency as well as the model used in those tests. Several new simulation studies
have appeared in the last decade to test these models and improve them to minimize
misspecifications. Barber and Lyon (1997) identify three sources of bias often found in
test statistics of long-run abnormal returns. These are the new listing bias, rebalancing
bias, and skewness bias. These biases arise because of the following reasons:
• Reference portfolios used as indices in calculating abnormal returns typically
include stocks that begin trading subsequent to the event month. As has been
extensively documented (Ritter (1991)), newly listed firms on an average un-
derperform in the first few months of trading. This gives rise to a positive
new listing bias in calculations of abnormal returns involving portfolios with
new-listed firms.
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• Reference portfolios whose returns are calculated using an equal-weighting scheme
are assumed to be rebalanced periodically.11 On the other hand, no such re-
balancing takes place for the sample firms for which the reference portfolios
were used as controls to calculate abnormal returns. Since equal weighting can
over-estimate the return during a time period due to bid-ask spreads of the
component stocks and non-synchronous trading, the corresponding abnormal
returns will possibly include a negative rebalancing bias.
• Long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns calculated using a reference portfolio
or a market index are positively skewed. This occurs because as the number of
firms in a reference portfolio increases, extreme positive observations become
less likely, while individual firms often have high positive returns. As a result,
a sample with a positive average abnormal return is more likely to have an
extreme positive observation leading to an inflated estimate of the underlying
standard deviation. This leads to a deflated t-statistic. On the other hand, a
sample with a negative average abnormal return is less likely to have an extreme
positive observation leading to a deflated estimate of the underlying standard
deviation. This leads to an inflated t-statistic. Thus, in samples with positive
abnormal returns, the calculated t-statistic is likely to be lower than the true
value, while in samples with negative abnormal returns, the corresponsing t-
statistic is likely to be higher than the true value. Thus, we obtain a negative
skewness bias in the observed t-statistics.
11For instance, if the returns are calculated monthly, then the corresponding portfolios are assumed
to be rebalanced monthly as well, with winners sold and losers bought at the end of each month.
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Barber and Lyon (1997) found that while t-statistics obtained from cumulative abnor-
mal returns and buy-and-hold abnormal returns are biased, matching sample firms
to control firms of similar sizes and book-to-market ratios eliminated these biases
and offered considerable improvements in random samples. Kothari and Warner
(1997), using various models for calculating abnormal returns such as CAPM and
the Fama-French three-factor model, also documented severely biased test statistics.
Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) (henceforth LBT) constructed two new statistics—
bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic and p-values based on pseudoportfolios—
and found some improvements compared to the control firm approach in some non-
random samples, but were still unable to avoid all biases. In addition, these test
statistics did not perform well in time clustered samples where overlapping returns is
an issue. Furthermore, they also find that the calendar time approach advocated by
Fama (1998) and used extensively is misspecified in nonrandom samples. Jegadeesh
and Karceski (2009) propose a new test of long-run performance by weighting ab-
normal returns of event firms to account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
Although their proposed test statistics perform better in industry-clustered samples
as well as in samples with overlapping returns, they do not perform tests on any other
type of clustering.
In spite of the attempts made in the above mentioned studies, the question of
which technique best estimates abnormal returns is thus far unresolved. This is
significant since calculations of long-run abnormal returns across various studies in
corporate finance have been shown to be particularly sensitive to the underlying ap-
proach used. The fundamental issue in such studies in estimating abnormal returns is
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the determination of what ‘abnormal’ constitutes. Using control firm(s) for a baseline
or ‘normal’ return provides significant ease and is intuitively appealing, and therefore
continues to be used in one form or another, with portfolios to single firms playing
the role of the control. The basis for the selection of the control has mostly been
size and book-to-market, with an increasing number of recent studies incorporating
momentum as well. Portfolios are generally constructed by selecting firms from the
same quantiles of the relevant characteristics, while single control firms are chosen
from the nearest available firms based on those characteristics. As seen in the previ-
ous section, this method can lead to significant biases if all relevant characteristics are
not matched on, and/or if the differences in the distributions of those characteristics
between the treatment and control groups are significantly large. Alternatively, sev-
eral studies use the calendar time portfolio approach suggested by Fama and French
(1999). While this helps significantly in reducing biases in time-clustered samples, the
performance in samples clustered on firm characteristics such as size or book-market
remains suspect (see Lyon et al. (1999)). In this section we document the existence
of such biases and investigate whether the propensity score formulation that was
successful in eliminating these biases in a simulated dataset is effective here as well.
The propensity score formulation gives us an alternative way of choosing controls,
providing much greater flexibility and precision in selecting controls while retaining
the intuitive appeal of using controls in defining abnormal returns.
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1.4.2 Data and Methodology
We use panel data for all publicly listed firms from NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ from
1984 to 2004, keeping only ordinary common shares with share codes 10 and 11. For
each firm we obtain financial statement data from the Compustat Annual Database.
We use a firm’s December filing where available. Otherwise we use the latest filing for
that calendar year. A firm is retained in our population for a particular year only if it
is on CRSP on December of that year and if we are able to obtain financial statement
information for that year from Compustat. We construct the following variables, all
dated as of December:
• Size - The market value of all outstanding common stock.
• Book-Market - The ratio of the book value of common equity to the market
value of all outstanding common stocks.
• Momentum - The six month buy-and-hold return for the common stock ending
in December.
• Leverage - The ratio of the total liabilities to the total assets.
• ROA - The ratio of the net income to total assets.
• Cash - The ratio of total cash and cash equivalents to total assets.
• TAT - The ratio of total sales to total assets.
These variables are normalized to have a zero mean and unit standard deviation for
ease in interpretation. The summary statistics of these variables are presented in
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Table 1.2. Due to the presence of a rather large number of Nasdaq firms, the Size
variable is highly skewed, with the difference between the minimum and the median
values being only about 0.01 standard deviation, while the maximum is 68 standard
deviations away from the mean. Since the bottom five size deciles are almost identical,
studies employing size-based reference portfolios to calculate long-run returns often
use decile breakpoints using NYSE firms. We simulate an event by randomly picking
out 200 firm-year observations and assigning them to the treatment group. For each
event, we select an event-month of January to be able to use the Momentum variable.
We then calculate long-run abnormal returns starting from the month of February for
12, 36, and 60 months using the methods described below. We repeat this exercise
2,000 times and compute the percentage of t-statistics from each method that falls in
the 5%, 2.5%, or 0.5% tails on left and right side of the corresponding t-distribution.
Since the events are generated at random, a well-specified test statistic should fall,
for instance, approximately 2.5% of the time in each of the 2.5% tails. The tests used
are described below.
1.4.2.1 Propensity Score Matching
A firm’s propensity score in any given year is its probability of participating in an
event as determined by its underlying characteristics. We assume that the first five
normalized variables described earlier cover the factors that can simultaneously influ-
ence a firm’s participation in an event and affect the firm’s future long-run returns.
We introduce nonlinearities into the model by including squares of the variables as
well. Since a firm’s true probability of participation is unknown, we estimate it using
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a logistic regression:



















T rit takes on a value of one if firm i participates in an event in year t. We then
assume that the predicted values of Trit are the true probabilities of the firm i’s
participation in an event in year t and refer to these as propensity scores. Having
obtained the propensity scores for each firm-year, we perform the matching procedure
using different methods as listed below. As a preliminary step, we first isolate the
set of all control units for each event firm whose propensity scores fall within 0.01
standard deviations of the event firm’s propensity score. The standard deviation
here is calculated using the predicted values of Trit from the logistic regression shown
above. If this fails to yield even a single match, we expand the radius to 0.02 standard
deviations and pick the closest unit as the only control. In this case, if multiple control
units have the same propensity score, they are all chosen as possible controls for the
corresponding event firm. The value of 0.01 as the initial caliper was empirically
determined to be suitable for the current population. The criterion was to ensure
sufficient number of matches to work with for further analysis while at the same time
to not have too large a caliper as to make the process computationally intractable.
It is likely that when the total number of observations in the population is small, the
caliper will need to be larger. Control units are replaced after each match and it is
therefore possible for two event firms to share one or more controls.
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1. Nearest Neighbor Matching within a Caliper - Having chosen a set of
possible matches for each event firm using the procedure described above, we
pick those control units that are closest to it in terms of propensity score alone.
The number of control units is allowed to vary from one to five, yielding five
different matched sets with one, two, three, four, and five nearest neighbors
respectively. Of course, if the initial caliper for an event firm contains less
than five control units, those observations are restricted while the remaining
are allowed to have upto five control units. Formally, suppose p denotes the
estimated propensity scores, and {k} is the set of all possible controls within
the caliper. Then, unit {j1..j5} is a control for event firm i if:
(a) |pi − pj1| < |pi − pk|, where k 6= j1,
(b) |pi − pj1| ≤ |pi − pj2| < |pi − pk|, where k 6= j1, j2,
(c) |pi − pj1| ≤ |pi − pj2| ≤ |pi − pj3| < |pi − pk|, where k 6= j1, j2, j3,
(d) |pi−pj1| ≤ |pi−pj2| ≤ |pi−pj3| ≤ |pi−pj4| < |pi−pk|, where k 6= j1, j2, j3, j4,
(e) |pi − pj1| ≤ |pi − pj2 | ≤ |pi − pj3| ≤ |pi − pj4| ≤ |pi − pj5| < |pi − pk|, where
k 6= j1, j2, j3, j4, j5
2. Caliper Matching - As the limiting case to the previous procedure, we use the
entire set of controls for each event firm found in the preliminary step. Here, the
number of matches for each event firm ranges from one to many in a matched
sample. In other words, the entire set {k} is chosen as controls for the event
firm. Figure 1.4 shows the number of matches found in random samples of 200
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firm-year observations over 2,000 iterations.12 Of the net 400,000 observations,
about 1% result in no matches within the caliper.13 Of the rest, about 15%
of the observations fall in each of the intervals 1-10, 11-20, 21-30, 31-40, and
41-50. Thus, to pick out up to five matches from within the caliper, we start
with more than 10 potential matches in more than 85% of the cases. This was
one of the criteria used in determining the caliper size.
3. Nearest Neighbor Mahalanobis Metric Matching within Propensity
Score Caliper - The first procedure uses propensity scores to determine near-
est neighbor(s). As an alternative, we consider determining nearest neighbors
using the Mahalanobis metric. This requires computing the distance between
the event firm and each control firm within the caliper using the Mahalanobis
metric. Since we assumed that five firm characteristics are responsible for de-
termining a firm’s probability of participating in an event in any given year, we
use the same set of five characteristics in estimating the Mahalanobis distance.




(Xi −Xj)TV −1(Xi −Xj)
Here, X denotes the 5x1 vector of firm characteristics. V is the covariance
matrix for the five variables which is estimated using the entire population. We
then pick matches that are closest to each event firm in terms of this distance.
Similar to the first procedure, we let the number of control units vary from one
12Results are presented in full detail in the next section.
13Not shown in the figure.
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to five. Analogously, if d denotes the estimated Mahalanobis distance, and {k}
is the set of all possible controls within the caliper. Then, unit {j1..j5} is a
control for event firm i if:
(a) |d(i, j1)| < |d(i, jk)|, where k 6= j1,
(b) |d(i, j1)| ≤ |d(i, j2)| < |d(i, jk)|, where k 6= j1, j2,
(c) |d(i, j1)| ≤ |d(i, j2)| ≤ |d(i, j3)| < |d(i, jk)|, where k 6= j1, j2, j3,
(d) |d(i, j1)| ≤ |d(i, j2)| ≤ |d(i, j3)| ≤ |d(i, j4)| < |d(i, jk)|, where k 6= j1, j2, j3, j4,
(e) |d(i, j1)| ≤ |d(i, j2)| ≤ |d(i, j3)| ≤ |d(i, j4)| ≤ |d(i, j5)| < |d(i, jk)|, where
k 6= j1, j2, j3, j4, j5
Since the Mahalanobis metric uses firm characteristics to measure the distance,
the subsequent matching procedure has the possibility of achieving better bal-
ancing of covariates between the event firms and their chosen controls. This
would be especially useful for highly skewed factors such as size.
The abnormal returns and the corresponding paired t-statistics are calculated as
follows:










where Ri is the buy-and-hold abnormal return of the event firm over 12, 36, or 60
months, Rj is the buy-and-hold abnormal return of each of N control firm, and n is
the number of non-missing observations.
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1.4.2.2 Control Firms using Size and Book-Market
• LBT Control Firm - In accordance with Lyon et al. (1999), one control firm
is chosen for each event firm. We first identify the set of all firms whose size
falls within approximately 30%14 of the the event firm’s size for that year. From
this set, we chose the firm with the closest book-market ratio to the event firm
as the control. This approach was found to be very useful in eliminating the
three main sources of biases documented earlier (Lyon and Barber (1997)). It
also gives us a yardstick to observe the performance gain or loss in the use of
propensity score matching in selecting single control units.
• Random Control Firms - We identify the set of all firms in the same size and
book-market quintile as the event firm for a particular year. We then pick 5
firms at random as controls. This is similar to the reference portfolios often used
in estimating abnormal returns. Like the LBT Control Firm above, it gives us
a useful benchmark to observe the performance of propensity score matching in
selecting five cotrol units.
The abnormal return and t-statistics are calculated using the same procedure as
outlined for propensity score matching above.
1.4.2.3 Ibbotson’s RATS
We use a modified version of the RATS procedure advocated by Ibbotson (1975) and
widely used now (eg. Peyer and Vermaelen (2009)). We first group participating
14The actual limits are as follows: We require the control firm size to be at least 25.7% and at
most 35% of the event firm size. We use the slightly skewed values to account for the skewness of
the distribution of firm size. The specific values were obtained by placing constraints on the log of
the firm size instead of the firm size itself.
26
firms in event-time. For instance, if firm A participated in an event in Jan, 1987 and
firm B in Jan, 1992, then:
• event-month 1 would comprise firm A in Feb, 1987 and firm B in Feb, 1992,
• event-month 2 would comprise firm A in Mar, 1987 and firm B in Mar, 1992,
• and so on...
We then run the following regression each event month:
Rit −Rft = αt∗ + βt∗(Rmt −Rft) + γt∗SMBt + δt∗HMLt + ηt∗UMDt + it,
where the dependent and the explanatory variables refer to the participating firm
and the usual Fama-French factors respectively in actual month t. Here, t∗ indexes
the event month. We run this regression for t∗ from 1 to 12, 36, and 60 respectively
and calculate the cumulative abnormal returns for a time horizon as the sum of
the monthly abnormal returns (αt∗). The standard error for each time horizon is
calculated as the square root of the sum of squares of the individual standard errors
from each event-month regression. Finally, we compute the t-statistic for difference












where T ∗ is one of 12, 36, or 60.
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1.4.2.4 Calendar Time Portfolios
Each calendar month in our sample, we select a group of firms that had an event in
the past 12, 36, or 60 months (excluding the event month) and form an equal/value-
weighted portfolio. Thus, to calculate the monthly abnormal returns:
• The Jan, 1990 portfolio would include all firms that had an event in the time in-
tervals Jan–Dec, 1989 for 12 months abnormal returns, Jan 1987–Dec 1989 for
36 months abnormal returns, and Jan 1985–Dec 1989 for 60 months abnormal
returns respectively.
• and so on for each month from Jan 1984–Dec 2004
We then calculate the monthly average abnormal returns using the Fama-French 4-
factor model:
Rt −Rft = α + β(Rmt −Rft) + γSMBt + δHMLt + ηUMDt + t, (1.1)
where Rt is the return on the equal/value-weighted portfolio. The monthly abnormal






where T is the total number of months in our data.
1.5 Results
In their analysis, LBT’s control firm method worked well in random samples partly
because it corrected for skewness bias. According to them, skewness bias arises be-
cause long-run returns of portfolios of multiple stocks are less likely to have extreme
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positive values than returns of individual stocks. However, there is another factor
at play here. In our analysis we assume that if a firm gets delisted prematurely, the
investment in that firm is sold at the time of delisting.15 If this is an event firm, then
the observation exits the sample at the time of delisting. The same holds true in
case of a solitary control firm. If, however, the delisted firm happens to be one of a
portfolio of control firms, then we assume that the proceeds of the sale are reinvested
equally into the remaining firms in the portfolio. We do not replace delisted control
firms by alternate firm(s) to preserve the quality of the original match.16 The ex-
pected lifetime of a portfolio of multiple stocks is greater than the expected lifetime
of an individual stock.17 Since the median and mean 1-year return of an individ-
ual stock are positive, a stock is more likely to have positive returns than negative.
Therefore, on an average, the longer the lifetime of a portfolio (with one or more
stocks to begin with), the higher the median returns. This can be seen in Figures 1.5,
1.6, and 1.7. Figure 1.5 shows the empirical 12-month buy-and-hold return distribu-
tion in two cases: first using 10,000 randomly picked stocks from the CRSP monthly
returns database between 1984 and 2004,18 and then using 5 sets of 10,000 randomly
picked stocks and aggregating them into equal-weighted portfolios to provide 10,000
separate portfolios of 5 stocks. These are represented by the solid and dashed lines
respectively. As we can see, the dashed line crosses the solid line and stays below
15In case of delisting with proceeds, we assume that the investment in the firm is liquidated
at the end of the month prior to the delisting. This is done to simplify the analysis by avoiding
reinvestments in the middle of a month.
16A firm that is chosen non-randomly as a control firm is, by definition, the best available control
for the event firm.
17where lifetime is defined as the duration for which we continue to earn returns on our investment,
which for a portfolio would be for as long as there is at least a single stock left.
18we choose this timeframe to maintain consistency with the rest of our analysis.
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it. It is therefore true as claimed by LBT that portfolios of multiple stocks are less
likely to have extreme positive returns than individual stocks. This is also valid in
Figures 1.6 and 1.7 that show the corresponding distributions for 36- and 60-month
returns respectively. We also see that in case of 12-month returns, the peak of both
distributions occur at about the same point, implying similar median values, but the
5-stock portfolio is a lot shorter on the negative side which should translate into a
higher mean value. For the 36- and 60-month returns, similar patterns are exhibited
with the additional fact that the peak for the 5-stock portfolio is shifted more to the
right, and the entire distribution is right-skewed as well, implying both higher median
and mean. The number of stocks in a portfolio used as a reference (or control) to
calculate abnormal returns thus plays a significant role in determining the value of
the abnormal return. As we increase the number of stocks in the control portfolio,
the expected value of the portfolio’s average buy-and-hold return for any duration
increases. This in turn leads to an increasing negative value for abnormal return.
1.5.1 Random Samples
Results of the specification test on random samples are presented in Table 1.3. The
six columns correspond to 0.5%, 2.5%, and 5% on the left and right tails of a t-
distribution. The values in each of the cells are the fraction of times (in %) that
a t-statistic exceeds the corresponding theoretical value. For instance, the first row
of the table shows the values for buy-and-hold abnormal returns calculated using 1
nearest neighbor within caliper using the propensity score distance measure. For this,
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0.2% of the 2,00019 t-statistics fall in the left 0.5% left tail of the corresponding t-
distribution, and 0.45% of the t-statistics fall in the right 0.5% tail. Similarly, 2.15% of
the t-statistics fall in the left 2.5% tail, and 1.75% fall in the right 2.5% tail. Finally,
4.95% fall in the left 5% tail and 3.9% in the right 5% tail. For a well specified
test, we expect the values to be close to the theoretical limits. For the 12-month
abnormal returns, using the propensity score distance measure, we see a pattern that
was expected. The fraction of t-statistics in the left 5% tail steadily increases from
4.95% with 1 nearest neighbor to 8.1% with 5 nearest neighbors. At the same time,
the fraction in the right 5% tail decreases from 3.9% to 2.9%. This is indicative of
increasing negative skewness as the number of stocks in the control portfolio increases.
Using all the stocks in the caliper (All in Caliper), the values in the left and right
5% tails are 9.4% and 2.25% respectively. The median number of stocks in a such
portfolio is more than 30, and the values here are therefore indicative of the extent of
skewness in the limiting case as the number of stocks in a portfolio keeps increasing.
Using the Mahalanobis distance measure to select nearest neighbors, we again see
some evidence of skewness. The fraction of t-statistics in the left and right 5% tails
goes up from 4.8% and 4.3% respectively with 1 neighbor to 6.35% and 3.6% for 5
neighbors. While there seems to be some improvement in using this measure over
propensity score distance, the benefit is eroded away for 36- and 60-month abnormal
returns, where we see greater degrees of skewness present.
The RATS procedure is highly skewed to the right with 9.5%, 18.85%, and 28.35%
of the t-statistics falling in the right 5% tail for 12-, 36-, and 60-month returns respec-
19the number of iterations
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tively. Furthermore, using calendar time portfolios with equal-weighted returns gives
very highly skewed t-statistics as well. In comparison, the value-weighted portfolio
approach performs much better, with the t-statistics for 12- and 36-month returns
being well specified. Only the 60-month return exhibits positive skewness, albeit still
being much better than when using equal-weighted returns.
The single control firm method advocated by LBT appears to be well specified.
Using portfolios of 5 randomly picked control firms in the same size and book-market
quintiles as the event firm gives us values similar to the propensity score approach
with 5 nearest neighbors. Thus, in random samples, when using a control firm (or
portfolio) approach, we see evidence supporting our earlier suggestion that the number
of firms in the portfolio plays a significant role in determining the extent of skewness
in the test statistic, with the negative skewness bias getting larger as the number of
firms in the portfolio increase.
The other side to this degradation in performance from using a large number of
firms in the control portfolio is the potential gain in efficiency from an increased num-
ber of degrees of freedom which is shown in Table 1.4. Each cell value gives the average
number of degrees of freedom used in the calculation of the t-statistic corresponding
to the method indicated in the row and the time horizon shown in the column. For
the 12-month returns for each iteration, this is the number of observations out of 200
where both the event firm and the control portfolio have non-vanishing returns for
1 year from the beginning of the event. A portfolio is considered to have a return
as long as there is at least one stock in the portfolio that has returns present for
the entire year. The values for the 36- and 60-month cases are defined analogously.
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As expected, as the number of firms in a portfolio increases, the degrees of freedom
increases as well, since the probability of at least one surviving firm being present in
the portfolio increases with the number of initial firms in the portfolio. We see that
for 12-month returns, using the propensity score distance measure leaves us with 83%
(166 out of 200) of the initial events that can be used in the calculation of abnormal
returns. This can be increased to 90% with 2 or more neighbors but not any further,
as seen by the value for All in Caliper. However, the difference becomes substantial
for 36- and 60-month returns. For 36-month returns, we go from 57.5% to 70.5% to
73.5% with 1, 2, and 3 neighbors respectively with the limit being about 75%. For
60-month returns, we similarly go from 41.5% to 55% to 60% with 1, 2, and 3 neigh-
bors respectively with the limit being about 63%. Thus there is a substantial gain in
going from 1 to 2 neighbors, a minor gain from 2 to 3, but not much thereafter. We
observe similar numbers using the LBT control firm and the 5 random firms portfolios
as well.
We next test for the power of some of these methods in detecting induced abnormal
returns. For each of the 2,000 iterations we add an additional 12-month return to
each event firm between -10% to +10% in steps of 2%. We then check for the fraction
of t-statistics that fall in the left or right 5% tail of the corresponding t-distribution
according to the sign of the induced return. The results are shown in Figure 1.8. To
maintain legibility, we do not include results from every method shown in Table 1.3,
and instead only show values for propensity score matching using the Mahalanobis
metric with 1 and 5 nearest neighbors, the LBT control firm, the RATS method, and
the calendar time portfolio method with value weighted returns. The improvement in
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power from using more nearest neighbors becomes apparent as the induced return is
increased (in either direction). However, at 5% the difference is only marginal. On the
other hand, with a -5% return, there is a larger difference but this can be attributed
to the negative skewness of the t-statistic when using 5 nearest neighbors. Using
LBT’s control firm gives us similar power to that obtained using 1 nearest neighbor.
The RATS method, owing to its high positive skewness, yields a very asymmetric
curve. The calendar time portfolio approach, using value weighted returns, does
provide improvement in power. At 5%(-5%) induced return, it has a power of about
26%(22%), which is higher than the 18%(17%) obtained from using propensity score
matching with 1 nearest neighbor.
1.5.2 Nonrandom Samples
We now consider choosing events from clusters of firms with common characteristics.
We assume a corporate event in which firms participate with probabilities determined
by their characteristics. Suppose, as the values of size, book-market, momentum,
leverage, and ROA go up, the probability of a firm participating in the event decreases.
To model this, we add these five variables for every firm-year and assign firms to
quintiles of this aggregate variable each year. We then randomly choose 200 firms
from the lowest quintile as our first clustering criterion. Alternately, we can suppose
that as the values of size, book-market, momentum, leverage, and ROA go up, the
probability of a firm participating in the event increases instead. In this case, we
choose our sample firms from the highest quintile of the aggregate variable as our
second clustering criterion.
34
We use this mode of selection to test the robustness of the propensity score match-
ing method. This is achieved in three ways:
1. The probability of a firm participating in an event depends solely on the sum of
its five characteristics as described above. There are about 95,000 observations
in our population. Therefore, a firm in the bottom quintile of the aggregate
variable defined above in a given year has about a 1%20 chance of being assigned
to the event group in the first case. All other firms in the top 4 quintiles have a
probability of 0. Similarly, in the second case, a firm in the top quintile of the
aggregate variable in a given year has about a 1% chance of being assigned to
the event group. All other firms in the bottom 4 quintiles have a probability of
0. In the logistic regression that estimates the propensity scores, however, we
add the five variables above and also their squares. This adds some noise to our
formulation.
2. An essential assumption in the use of propensity scores for matching is that
all variables that are simultaneously responsible for assigning treatment and
affecting outcome should be accounted for. In practical applications it is often
difficult to ascertain whether this is being satisfied. We test the robustness of
the propensity score method in calculating abnormal returns to the exclusion
of relevant factors by omitting two of the variables that we know influence
selection. Specifically, we estimate propensity scores by using only size, book-
20A quintile holds about 19,000 observations. Since we are picking 200 firm-year observations as
our event sample, the probability is approximately 200/19000.
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market, and momentum and their squares in the logistic regression:










3. To ensure that no relevant variables are being missed, a common approach to
using propensity scores in research is to use as many variables as possible in
the context of the study. It is likely that some of the variables do not play
a role in determining participation in an event. We test for the robustness of
the propensity score method to inclusion of irrelevant factors by adding in two
additional variables, cash & cash equivalents and total asset turnover and their
squares in the logistic regression to estimate propensity scores:



























Table 1.5 shows the results of specification tests on samples clustered on the lowest
quintile of the constructed variable. The propensity score method is contained in
three parts as described above using 3, 5, and 7 variables, presented in that order
in the table. We see that when using 3 of the 5 relevant variables, every method
using propensity scores fares well for 12-month returns, but gets considerably worse
over longer horizons. Using the propensity score metric and 1 nearest neighbor, the
fraction of t-statistics in the left and right 5% tails respectively are (4.6%,6.5%) for
12-months, (9.2%,2.35%) for 36-months, and (9.7%,1.7%) for 60-months, with more
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neighbors yielding higher negative skewness. The Mahalanobis metric gives similar
results. Thus, ignoring 2 of the relevant variables clearly biases our results, with
the bias getting considerably worse over longer time horizons. With 5 variables, we
expect the propensity score method to be reasonably well specified since we are using
the very variables that the sample is clustered on. As seen earlier in the results for
random samples, we get values quite close to the theoretical limits when using upto 2
nearest neighbors, with both the propensity score metric and the Mahalanobis metric
providing similar results. When we add the two irrelevant variables, the Mahalanobis
metric does provide some advantage over the propensity score measure. Similar to
prior results, we also see that skewness is within acceptable limits as long as the
number of nearest neibhbors doesn’t exceed 2. With 2 nearest neighbors, the fraction
of t-statistics in the left 5% tail with the propensity score measure are 7.15%, 6.95%,
and 6.2% for the three time horizons. The corresponding values with the Mahalanobis
metric are 6.4%, 5.9%, and 6.1% respectively. LBT’s control firm method is nega-
tively skewed with 12.65% in the left 5% tail for 60-month returns. With the RATS
procedure, while the fraction of t-stats in the tails doesn’t exceed theoretical limits,
the total values suggest that the formulation is still misspecified, since the tails get
too little. For instance, for the 12-month returns we get (2.55%,4.35%) in both the
5% tails, adding up to 6.9% which trails the theoretical 10%. The equal-weighted
calendar time portfolios are still very positively skewed. With the value-weighted
portfolios we get much better performance, but the values are still skewed on the
negative side and not better than the propensity score method with Mahalanobis
metric.
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Table 1.6 shows the results of specification tests on samples clustered on the
highest quintile of the constructed variable. With 3 variables, as seen before, we
get well specified results for 12-month returns, but progressively worse for longer
time horizons. With 5 and 7 variables, we get well specified results with 2 nearest
neighbors. The values don’t get much worse even with more than 2 neighbors. For
instance, using the Mahalanobis metric with 7 variables and 2 nearest neighbors, we
get (5.05%,5.3%) for 12-months, (4.85%,6.45%) for 36-months, and (3.95%,5.15%) for
60-months in the left and right 5% tails. In this case, however, we don’t see much
difference between using the propensity score measure and the Mahalanobis measure
with 7 variables that we saw in the previous table. Conventional methods have a
severe positive skewness. Using LBT’s control firm, we get 11.6%, 14.1%, and 12.6%
in the right 5% tail for the three time horizons. The corresponding values for the
RATS procedure are 17.35%, 42.35%, and 43.8%, respectively, with similar values for
the equal-weighted calendar time portfolios. With value-weighted portfolios, we get
slightly better results but severely skewed nonetheless, with 8.9%, 10.1%, and 14.7%
of the t-statistics in the right 5% tail for 12-, 36-, and 60-month returns.
The results thus far suggest that while the propensity score method with one near-
est neighbor yields well specified results, we stand to gain much in terms of efficiency
with little lost in terms of bias by going to two nearest neighbors. The Mahalanobis
metric may provide better results in some situations compared to the propensity score
measure, so in practical applications it may prove useful to apply both and compare
the results. We also see that while LBT’s control firm method performs identical to
the propensity score method with one nearest neighbor in random samples, there is
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a considerable drop in performance for the former when the samples are drawn from
clusters where size and book-market alone are clearly not enough to account for the
bias. Ibbotson’s RATS method is severely misspecified in all 3 scenarios considered
thus far and so are equal-weighted calendar time portfolios. Value-weighted portfolios
do yield much better results, but are still very misspecified in clustered samples.
1.5.3 Time-Clustered Samples
Next, we compare the performance of the various methods in time-clustered samples.
We randomly select a year and then randomly select 200 firms to assign an event to.
The event month is still January. For instance, 200 random firms are assigned an event
on Jan 1994. This procedure is repeated 2,000 times and the distribution of the t-
statistics is recorded as in the prior tables. This way of choosing samples introduces a
high degree of cross-sectional correlation. Therefore, we expect that the calendar time
portfolios should provide much better results than methods using control portfolios,
since the former will discount the effect of time clustering. We should note, however,
that in practical applications, events clustered in time are likely to be spread out over
a few months instead of all being concentrated in just one month. The method used
here, therefore, is an extreme case used to test the robustness of using propensity
scores to select matches.
The results are presented in Table 1.7. To estimate propensity scores, we use the
5 variables we originally used with random samples. For 12-month returns, with the
propensity score distance, we get 6.4% of the t-statistics in the left 5% tail using 1
nearest neighbor, and 7.35% using 2 nearest neighbors. Mahalanobis metric gives
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slightly worse results. As the time horizon gets longer, the results get better since
the effect of the time clustering gets diluted. Over 36-months, the propensity score
distance with 2 nearest neighbors yields 6.2% in the left 5% tail. The corresponding
value for 60-months is 5.65%. LBT’s control firm performs very similar to the propen-
sity score distance with 1 nearest neighbor with 6.1%, 4.65%, and 4.75% in the left
5% tail for 12-, 36-, and 60-months. The RATS method, operating explicitly in event
time, performs very poorly, with almost 80% of the t-statistics falling in the tails
corresponding to 10% of the distribution for 12-month returns. With calendar-time
portfolios, the equal-weighted approach still remains positively skewed, with over half
the t-statistics in the right 5% tail for 60-month returns. The value-weighted port-
folios are well-specified for 12- and 36-months, which was expected since the returns
are constructed in calendar-time. Only for 60-months do we get a hint of skewness
with 7.4% of the t-statistics in the right 5% tail, since the effect of the time-clustering
gets weaker and the sample approaches a randomly constructed sample.
In time-clustered samples, therefore, the propensity score distance method with 2
nearest neighbors has a slight negative bias only for 12-month returns. The clustering
ceases to matter over longer time horizons. Using 1 nearest neighbor still provides
satisfactory results.
1.5.4 Serial-Correlated Samples
We now explicitly introduce serial correlation in our samples. We first randomly select
100 firms in years such that these firms are present in our population for at least one
more year. We then select the same firms in the next calendar year to complete our
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sample. Thus, if firm A was chosen on Jan 1992, it is selected again on Jan 1993.
All other firms are chosen this way as well. This procedure is repeated 2,000 times to
complete our test. Since the returns overlap for 36- and 60-month time horizons, any
method using control portfolios has a likelihood of being misspecified other than for
12-month returns. With calendar time portfolios, however, we expect well specified
results since these portfolios control for serial correlation by counting a firm with
multiple occurences only once.
The results are presented in Table 1.8. The propensity score methods with 1
and 2 nearest neighbors are well specified for 12-months. For longer time-horizons,
we observe a fat-tails effect. For 36-months with the Mahalanobis metric, we have
(6.95%,6.25%) of the t-statistics in the left and right 5% tails with 1 nearest neighbor
and (7.65%,6.5%) with 2 nearest neighbors. For 60-months, the corresponding values
are (6%,6.25%) with 1 nearest neighbor, and (7.35%,6.85%) with 2 nearest neighbors.
As before, with more neighbors, we get higher negative skewness. The propensity
score distance gives us slightly worse results. The LBT control firm approach, again,
gives similar results to the propensity score method with 1 nearest neighbor. The
RATS method, as usual, is severely skewed in the positive direction, as is the calendar
time portfolio method with equal-weighting. Value-weighted calendar time portfolios
give much better results. We get some evidence of skewness for 60-months, with 7.2%
of the t-statistics in the positive 5% tail.
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1.6 Conclusions
The tests performed in the previous section suggest that no method works perfectly
all the time. There are, however, useful inferences to be drawn from our results. We
see that in random samples and in samples where clustering is based on time, LBT’s
control firm method provides very similar results to those obtained using propensity
score matching with one nearest neighbor. The power in random samples is similar
as well. Since LBT’s method is constrained to use only size and book-market, we
observe a drastic performance drop when samples are drawn from clusters based
on multiple firm characteristics. It might be possible to posit an alternate control
firm scheme, perhaps by replacing size and/or book-market by more suitable factors
as demanded by the application, or by adding additional discrete factors such as
industry. However, it is not practically feasible to extend this approach to several
variables simultaneously. This is the very dilemma that propensity score matching
aims to resolve. When using one nearest neighbor, at worst the propensity score
matching method performs similar to LBT’s control firm method. At best, it is much
better at eliminating bias. Adding additional neighbors as controls helps improve
efficiency by increasing the numbers of observations of long-run abnormal returns.
But this comes at a price of increasing negative skewness. Based on the evidence,
2 nearest neighbors offers the greatest increase in efficiency while at the same time
keeping skewness under reasonable limits. When using 2 nearest neighbors, there
is some hint of skewness in time-clustered samples over shorter time horizons and
samples with high serial correlation over longer time horizons. It should be noted
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that in such samples, a similar amount of slight skewness also appears in t-statistics
from value-weighted calendar time portfolios over 60-month returns.
The fact that the propensity score method doesn’t have a one-dimensional series
of steps to follow is perhaps what makes it so useful in a wide variety of applications.
At the same time, there are several decisions to be made prior to its implementation.
The caliper we used was derived from empirical considerations of the distribution of
propensity scores. Different applications will in all likelihood have varying propen-
sity score distributions leading to the appropriate caliper size being different as well.
The question of which metric to use in measuring distances between treated and con-
trol units is a trickier one to answer. In most scenarios considered above, both the
propensity score metric and the Mahalanobis metric yielded very similar results. In
nonrandom samples while using 7 variables to estimate propensity scores, the Maha-
lanobis metric generally had a lower incidence of type-I errors than the propensity
score distance. We observe slightly better performance by the Mahalanobis metric in
serial-correlated samples as well. On the other hand, in time-clustered samples over
12-month horizon, the propensity score distance performs better. In either case, the
difference in performance isn’t very large. For instance, in Table 1.5 for 36-month
returns, while using propensity score matching with 7 variables, the propensity score
distance with two nearest neighbors yields 6.95% of the t-statistics in the left 5%
tail, while with the Mahalanobis metric we get 5.9%. Meanwhile, in Table 1.7 for
12-month returns, the corresponding numbers are 7.35% vs. 8.15% in favor of the
propensity score distance measure. This is typically the extent of the difference be-
tween the two metrics. Overall, it appears that the Mahalanobis metric might be at
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an advantage with samples clustered on firm characteristics because of its potential
ability to provide better balance between the event and the control firms in terms of
the covariates. This can easily be checked in actual applications.
Ibbotson’s RATS method and the equal-weghted calendar time portfolios, both
using the Fama-French factors with momentum, are severely skewed. Their use should
be avoided in calculations of long-run abnormal returns. Using value-weighted port-
folios gives us much better results, with the test statistic being well-specified most of
the time in random samples and clustered samples based on time. Its big drawback,
however, is in its inability to account for clustering along multiple firm characteris-
tics. Of the methods tested here, therefore, propensity score matching with one or
two nearest neighbors is the most promising.
44
Table 1.1: Mean Bias Percentage in Outcome
This table shows the bias in treatment effect estimates using simple averaging across groups, quantile
matching, and propensity score matching. Each value represents the percentage difference from
the actual treatment effect as calculated using the method in the corresponding row. The actual
treatment effect is 1. The error term in the outcome equation is assumed to be normally distributed
with zero mean and a standard deviation of 0.5. Each of the independent variables (X) is normally
distributed with a unit standard deviation. d is the difference in means of X-variables between
treated and untreated samples. average is the difference in average outcome between the treated
and untreated populations. 1/5 → 5/5 denotes matching using one → five of the five independent
variables.
d −→ 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
average 49.84 99.22 149.34 200.13 250.24
Quantile Matching
1/5 variables 43.72 86.67 130.39 174.92 218.70
2/5 variables 37.02 74.02 111.56 149.53 187.23
3/5 variables 30.76 61.56 92.57 124.39 155.42
4/5 variables 24.58 49.03 73.74 98.76 123.88
5/5 variables 18.22 36.69 55.05 73.56 92.04
Propensity Score Matching
1/5 variables 39.98 80.76 119.94 160.33 199.64
2/5 variables 29.76 60.45 90.24 119.86 149.86
3/5 variables 19.70 40.58 59.81 80.49 100.09
4/5 variables 10.18 19.89 29.98 40.56 50.17
5/5 variables 0.01 0.00 0.24 0.26 0.08
45
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of Full Sample
This table shows the summary statistics of the variables used in logistic regressions in determining
propensity scores of simulated events. All variables are made to have zero mean and unit standard
deviation prior to further analysis. Size is the market value of common stock, Book-Market is the
ratio of the market to the book value of common stock, Momentum is the six-month buy-and-hold
return on the firm’s common stock ending in December, Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to
total assets, Return on Assets is the ratio of the net income to total assets, Cash & Cash Equivaluents
is the ratio of total cash & cash equivalents to total assets, Total Asset Turnover is the ratio of the
total annual sales to total assets. All values are obtained from December filings, whenever possible.
Otherwise, we use the latest available filing for that calendar year.
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. SD
Size -0.157 -0.154 -0.146 0 -0.103 68.38 1
Book-Market -0.744 -0.421 -0.182 0 0.156 103.3 1
Momentum -2.119 -0.514 -0.079 0 0.345 50.33 1
Leverage -2.106 -0.798 0.026 0 0.748 1.903 1
Return on Assets -107.8 0.001 0.172 0 0.35 82.98 1
Cash & Cash Equivalents -0.834 -0.674 -0.433 0 0.274 4.199 1
Total Asset Turnover -2.278 -0.71 -0.128 0 0.423 67.79 1
46
Table 1.3: Specification Tests - Random Samples
We randomly select 200 firm-years from our sample and assign each of these an event. For each event, we assign an event month of January. We
then calculate long-run abnormal returns using the methods tabulated below. We repeat this exercise 2,000 times and compute the percentage of
t-statistics from each method that falls in the 5%, 2.5%, or 0.5% tails on the left and right sides of the corresponding t-distribution. For propensity
score matching, we use a caliper of 0.01 standard deviations of the predicted values from the corresponding logistic regression to select our matches
from. If this doesn’t produce any matches, we use an additional caliper of 0.02 standard deviations from which one match is selected. The variables
used to calculate estimated propensity scores are Size, Book-Market, Momentum, Leverage, and Return on Assets, and their squares.
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
12-Month Returns
Propensity Score Matching (5 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.20 0.45 2.15 1.75 4.95 3.90
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.65 0.10 3.00 1.45 6.60 3.90
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.90 0.15 3.80 1.25 7.20 3.25
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.20 0.10 4.40 1.15 7.40 2.85
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.20 0.00 4.75 1.20 8.10 2.90
All in Caliper 1.90 0.00 6.40 0.85 9.40 2.25
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.40 0.40 2.60 1.80 4.80 4.30
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.75 0.15 3.00 1.60 5.55 4.20
Continued on Next Page. . .
47
Table 1.3 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.85 0.20 3.45 1.25 6.15 3.80
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.25 0.10 3.75 1.10 6.40 3.70
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.30 0.15 3.90 1.20 6.35 3.60
Conventional Methods
Control Firm LBT Control Firm 0.25 0.25 3.05 2.00 5.95 4.55
5 Random Control Firms 1.10 0.15 4.75 1.15 8.40 3.05
Ibbotson’s RATS 0.05 1.10 0.55 4.75 1.15 9.50
Calendar Time Portfolios Equal Weghted w/ FF 4-factor 0.05 2.85 0.25 12.75 0.55 22.10
Value Weighted w/ FF 4-factor 0.45 0.40 1.95 2.20 4.10 4.45
36-Month Returns
Propensity Score Matching (5 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.20 0.35 2.10 1.90 4.80 4.45
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.40 0.25 2.35 1.70 5.10 3.40
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.30 0.00 3.05 0.80 5.65 2.75
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 1.3 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.80 0.00 3.70 0.65 7.05 2.25
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.00 0.00 4.00 0.30 7.45 1.60
All in Caliper 2.40 0.00 7.15 0.50 11.30 1.75
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.30 0.30 2.35 1.90 5.15 4.95
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.50 0.10 3.20 1.65 6.60 4.55
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.85 0.25 3.30 1.60 6.20 3.85
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.25 0.25 3.90 1.25 7.10 2.90
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.15 0.15 4.20 1.20 7.15 2.85
Conventional Methods
Control Firm LBT Control Firm 0.40 0.50 2.25 2.15 4.85 4.65
5 Random Control Firms 1.00 0.05 4.85 0.50 8.55 2.60
Ibbotson’s RATS 0.00 2.45 0.10 10.55 0.20 18.85
Calendar Time Portfolios Equal Weghted w/ FF 4-factor 0.00 10.90 0.00 30.20 0.05 43.70
Value Weighted w/ FF 4-factor 0.20 0.85 1.50 3.20 3.55 5.95
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 1.3 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
60-Month Returns
Propensity Score Matching (5 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.15 0.25 2.15 1.80 4.90 4.05
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.45 0.25 3.35 1.40 5.70 3.90
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.70 0.15 3.40 1.10 6.80 2.95
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.10 0.10 4.15 1.30 8.00 2.75
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.40 0.05 4.85 1.00 8.30 2.90
All in Caliper 3.20 0.00 9.00 0.25 12.85 1.50
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.25 0.20 1.85 1.95 4.90 4.30
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.50 0.10 3.15 1.65 6.10 4.05
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.00 0.05 3.65 1.05 7.10 3.20
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.10 0.00 4.40 0.95 7.90 3.00
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.10 0.00 4.85 1.15 8.80 3.05
Conventional Methods
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 1.3 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
Control Firm LBT Control Firm 0.55 0.20 2.70 2.30 5.60 5.00
5 Random Control Firms 1.45 0.10 4.40 1.30 7.95 2.70
Ibbotson’s RATS 0.05 5.35 0.05 18.00 0.10 28.35
Calendar Time Portfolios Equal Weghted w/ FF 4-factor 0.00 15.25 0.05 35.90 0.10 49.85
Value Weighted w/ FF 4-factor 0.50 1.00 2.30 5.55 4.55 9.75
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Table 1.4: Degrees of Freedom with Control Portfolios
This table shows the degrees of freedom for t-statistics in specification tests in random samples
using various control portfolio approaches. For each of the 2,000 iterations we measure the number
of observations (out of 200) where both the event firm and control firm(s) portfolio have long-run
returns available on CRSP. We do this for 12-, 36-, and 60-months respectively. For control firm








Propensity Score Matching (5 Variables)
Propensity 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 166 115 83
Score Distance 2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 179 141 110
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 180 147 120
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 180 148 123
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 180 149 124
All in Caliper 180 149 125
Mahalanobis 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 168 118 87
Distance 2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 179 142 112
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 180 147 120
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 180 148 123
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 180 149 124
Conventional Methods
Control Firm LBT Control Firm 168 118 87
5 Random Control Firms 182 151 126
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Table 1.5: Specification Tests - Non-random Samples - I
For each firm-year observation, we define a new variable as the sum of normalized Size, Book-Market, Momentum, Leverage, and Return on Assets.
We divide firms into quintiles of this variable each year and then select 200 firm-years from the lowest quintile and assign each of these an event.
For each event, we assign an event month of January. This produces non-random samples. We then calculate long-run abnormal returns using the
methods tabulated below. We repeat this exercise 2,000 times and compute the percentage of t-statistics from each method that falls in the 5%,
2.5%, or 0.5% tails on the left and right sides of the corresponding t-distribution. For propensity score matching, we use a caliper of 0.01 standard
deviations of the predicted values from the corresponding logistic regression to select our matches from. If this doesn’t produce any matches, we use
an additional caliper of 0.02 standard deviations from which one match is selected. The variables used to calculate estimated propensity scores are
Size, Book-Market, Momentum, Leverage, Return on Assets, Cash & Cash-equivalents, and Total Asset Turnover, and their squares. The first three
are used in estimating propensity scores with three variables, the first five for five variables, and all for seven variables.
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
12-Month Returns
Propensity Score Matching (3 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.45 0.20 2.10 2.55 4.60 6.50
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.55 0.15 2.45 2.10 4.55 5.45
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.00 0.15 2.65 1.85 4.60 4.90
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.90 0.20 2.90 1.75 5.20 4.55
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.80 0.15 3.05 1.70 5.20 4.80
All in Caliper 1.15 0.15 3.35 1.75 5.30 4.30
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 1.5 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.45 0.70 1.70 3.50 3.50 7.30
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.75 0.35 2.35 2.70 4.10 5.45
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.70 0.25 2.50 2.30 4.40 5.20
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.90 0.20 2.55 2.35 4.60 4.95
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.00 0.20 2.80 2.15 5.10 4.60
Propensity Score Matching (5 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.70 0.10 2.30 1.80 4.70 5.30
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.90 0.25 3.25 1.35 5.50 3.75
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.95 0.05 3.85 1.10 5.95 3.45
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.25 0.20 4.00 1.20 6.10 2.95
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.45 0.10 4.15 1.25 6.60 3.20
All in Caliper 1.60 0.15 4.25 1.05 6.85 2.35
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.35 0.25 2.25 2.20 4.60 4.45
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.80 0.20 2.70 1.65 5.05 3.80
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 1.5 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.85 0.25 3.10 1.25 6.05 3.50
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.00 0.10 3.45 1.35 6.05 3.40
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.10 0.20 3.50 1.25 6.50 3.15
Propensity Score Matching (7 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.50 0.75 2.75 2.30 5.30 4.80
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.70 0.30 4.05 1.90 7.15 4.15
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.05 0.15 4.35 1.80 8.10 3.65
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.05 0.30 4.70 1.50 8.25 3.25
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.45 0.15 5.00 1.55 8.55 3.05
All in Caliper 1.60 0.10 5.30 1.05 8.80 3.25
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.35 0.30 2.10 1.80 4.95 4.70
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.55 0.10 3.30 2.05 6.40 4.15
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.15 0.10 4.20 1.80 7.05 3.90
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.55 0.25 4.20 1.50 7.50 3.90
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 1.5 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.65 0.20 4.40 1.70 7.95 3.75
Conventional Methods
Control Firm LBT Control Firm 0.80 0.05 4.40 0.80 7.90 2.85
5 Random Control Firms 2.65 0.00 5.95 0.45 9.70 1.55
Ibbotson’s RATS 0.10 0.15 1.05 1.90 2.55 4.35
Calendar Time Portfolios Equal Weghted w/ FF 4-factor 0.00 2.90 0.05 13.50 0.15 23.75
Value Weighted w/ FF 4-factor 0.65 0.05 3.25 0.75 7.10 2.40
36-Month Returns
Propensity Score Matching (3 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 1.00 0.05 4.95 0.80 9.20 2.35
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.75 0.05 5.85 0.35 11.15 2.05
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 2.45 0.00 8.00 0.35 11.70 1.90
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 3.30 0.00 9.25 0.40 14.05 1.60
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 3.30 0.00 9.80 0.45 14.95 1.45
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 1.5 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
All in Caliper 5.40 0.00 12.50 0.25 17.60 1.05
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 1.15 0.10 4.20 1.00 8.80 2.65
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.70 0.10 6.00 0.90 9.70 1.75
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 2.50 0.00 7.30 0.75 12.10 1.90
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 2.70 0.00 8.40 0.70 13.25 2.00
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 3.05 0.00 9.20 0.45 13.95 1.80
Propensity Score Matching (5 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.40 0.30 1.90 1.60 4.25 3.75
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.60 0.30 2.45 1.30 6.00 3.00
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.70 0.15 3.30 0.75 7.80 3.05
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.20 0.15 3.90 1.00 7.70 2.65
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.50 0.10 4.45 0.80 8.55 2.80
All in Caliper 2.25 0.10 5.70 0.65 9.35 1.85
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.20 0.15 2.05 1.60 4.35 3.40
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 1.5 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.50 0.05 3.05 0.90 6.35 3.05
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.85 0.10 3.40 1.20 7.05 2.65
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.80 0.05 3.90 0.95 7.10 2.50
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.15 0.05 4.10 0.90 7.80 2.40
Propensity Score Matching (7 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.15 0.30 2.70 2.05 4.80 4.85
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.65 0.40 3.55 1.75 6.95 3.90
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.05 0.25 4.50 1.25 8.30 3.30
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.30 0.10 5.50 1.55 8.80 3.00
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.70 0.20 6.00 1.55 9.85 3.05
All in Caliper 2.25 0.05 6.85 0.90 10.65 2.55
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.20 0.40 2.05 2.15 4.40 5.10
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.70 0.30 3.00 1.70 5.90 4.50
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.85 0.20 3.70 1.50 6.85 3.45
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Table 1.5 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.00 0.10 4.40 1.60 7.70 3.55
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.20 0.15 4.65 1.30 7.95 3.30
Conventional Methods
Control Firm LBT Control Firm 1.10 0.00 5.10 0.55 9.05 2.15
5 Random Control Firms 3.35 0.00 10.60 0.20 15.55 0.95
Ibbotson’s RATS 0.15 0.55 0.75 2.65 1.60 5.70
Calendar Time Portfolios Equal Weghted w/ FF 4-factor 0.00 13.45 0.00 39.15 0.00 54.70
Value Weighted w/ FF 4-factor 0.65 0.10 3.25 0.90 6.70 2.40
60-Month Returns
Propensity Score Matching (3 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 1.20 0.10 5.10 0.70 9.70 1.70
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.65 0.05 7.20 0.40 12.55 1.55
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 3.00 0.05 9.40 0.35 14.60 1.00
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 3.65 0.05 9.80 0.25 15.55 0.80
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Table 1.5 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 4.55 0.05 10.80 0.35 16.80 0.85
All in Caliper 6.50 0.05 15.05 0.25 20.80 0.45
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.75 0.05 4.65 0.60 9.25 2.00
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.50 0.05 6.45 0.15 12.30 1.35
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 2.75 0.05 8.65 0.35 14.20 1.00
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 3.55 0.05 9.90 0.20 15.65 0.85
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 4.35 0.10 11.15 0.35 16.30 0.80
Propensity Score Matching (5 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.25 0.30 2.35 2.20 4.65 4.75
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.60 0.20 2.50 1.20 5.85 3.65
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.80 0.15 3.25 1.10 6.30 2.80
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.05 0.10 3.90 1.00 8.15 2.40
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.15 0.10 4.40 0.85 8.70 1.85
All in Caliper 1.95 0.05 6.15 0.60 10.00 1.20
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 1.5 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.35 0.15 2.50 1.95 5.10 4.30
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.55 0.10 3.30 1.20 6.00 3.40
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.90 0.15 3.55 1.50 7.10 3.05
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.15 0.05 3.75 0.90 7.55 2.50
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.15 0.10 4.75 1.00 8.05 2.45
Propensity Score Matching (7 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.10 0.15 2.25 1.50 6.10 3.80
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.50 0.10 3.35 1.35 6.20 2.95
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.25 0.10 4.05 1.00 7.65 2.65
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.30 0.15 4.75 0.85 8.50 2.25
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.50 0.10 5.50 0.65 9.40 2.25
All in Caliper 2.50 0.00 7.15 0.35 11.55 1.70
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.15 0.25 1.75 1.40 4.05 3.85
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.30 0.25 2.85 1.70 6.10 3.50
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Table 1.5 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.60 0.05 3.70 1.05 6.70 3.25
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.05 0.05 4.15 0.90 7.20 2.90
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.30 0.10 4.60 0.95 8.15 2.80
Conventional Methods
Control Firm LBT Control Firm 1.70 0.00 7.15 0.50 12.65 1.55
5 Random Control Firms 4.35 0.00 12.15 0.10 18.05 0.45
Ibbotson’s RATS 0.05 0.50 0.55 2.95 1.05 6.60
Calendar Time Portfolios Equal Weghted w/ FF 4-factor 0.00 17.35 0.00 44.70 0.00 60.40
Value Weighted w/ FF 4-factor 0.85 0.10 3.75 1.25 7.75 2.65
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Table 1.6: Specification Tests - Non-random Samples - II
For each firm-year observation, we define a new variable as the sum of normalized Size, Book-Market, Momentum, Leverage, and Return on Assets.
We divide firms into quintiles of this variable each year and then select 200 firm-years from the highest quintile and assign each of these an event.
For each event, we assign an event month of January. This produces non-random samples. We then calculate long-run abnormal returns using the
methods tabulated below. We repeat this exercise 2,000 times and compute the percentage of t-statistics from each method that falls in the 5%,
2.5%, or 0.5% tails on the left and right sides of the corresponding t-distribution. For propensity score matching, we use a caliper of 0.01 standard
deviations of the predicted values from the corresponding logistic regression to select our matches from. If this doesn’t produce any matches, we use
an additional caliper of 0.02 standard deviations from which one match is selected. The variables used to calculate estimated propensity scores are
Size, Book-Market, Momentum, Leverage, Return on Assets, Cash & Cash-equivalents, and Total Asset Turnover, and their squares. The first three
are used in estimating propensity scores with three variables, the first five for five variables, and all for seven variables.
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
12-Month Returns
Propensity Score Matching (3 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.05 0.90 0.75 4.50 2.85 7.70
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.10 0.45 1.70 3.10 4.30 6.40
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.30 0.35 2.45 2.35 4.80 5.65
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.35 0.35 2.55 2.30 5.20 5.65
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.60 0.30 2.50 2.10 5.20 4.85
All in Caliper 0.85 0.10 3.30 1.70 5.60 4.40
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 1.6 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.25 0.40 1.95 2.80 5.15 4.95
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.55 0.25 2.60 1.55 5.80 4.15
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.65 0.25 2.80 1.45 6.00 3.45
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.65 0.20 3.40 1.30 6.10 3.45
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.70 0.20 3.25 1.55 5.95 3.15
Propensity Score Matching (5 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.20 0.30 2.40 2.90 4.40 5.40
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.60 0.15 3.00 2.15 5.00 5.10
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.55 0.00 3.05 1.70 5.50 4.60
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.65 0.15 3.30 1.95 6.00 4.25
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.85 0.20 3.50 1.70 6.10 3.75
All in Caliper 1.10 0.20 3.70 1.25 6.00 3.40
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.35 0.55 2.30 2.25 4.65 4.90
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.60 0.25 2.55 1.70 5.40 4.40
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Table 1.6 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.45 0.25 3.30 1.25 5.55 3.85
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.65 0.20 3.15 1.45 5.80 3.65
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.80 0.15 3.05 1.20 6.25 3.55
Propensity Score Matching (7 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.35 0.40 1.60 2.90 3.45 6.30
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.35 0.30 2.25 2.55 4.25 6.10
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.55 0.25 2.40 2.25 4.85 5.30
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.55 0.15 2.90 2.05 5.60 5.10
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.55 0.15 2.80 2.05 5.50 4.55
All in Caliper 0.90 0.10 2.70 1.35 5.75 4.25
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.55 0.45 2.00 2.85 3.95 5.65
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.45 0.45 2.15 2.15 5.05 5.30
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.65 0.30 2.60 1.95 5.05 5.00
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.75 0.30 2.70 2.05 5.45 4.90
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Table 1.6 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.80 0.30 2.95 1.95 5.05 4.75
Conventional Methods
Control Firm LBT Control Firm 0.00 2.15 0.60 6.65 1.60 11.60
5 Random Control Firms 0.05 1.00 0.65 6.80 1.40 13.35
Ibbotson’s RATS 0.00 2.65 0.20 9.75 0.65 17.35
Calendar Time Portfolios Equal Weghted w/ FF 4-factor 0.00 11.75 0.00 32.90 0.00 47.40
Value Weighted w/ FF 4-factor 0.05 0.70 0.65 3.75 1.70 8.90
36-Month Returns
Propensity Score Matching (3 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.15 1.65 0.50 6.45 1.65 11.25
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.05 1.25 0.85 5.25 1.85 10.30
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.00 0.90 0.80 5.25 2.30 9.50
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.00 1.00 1.05 4.60 2.70 8.95
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.10 0.65 1.00 4.50 2.65 8.35
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 1.6 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
All in Caliper 0.40 0.45 1.65 3.35 3.25 7.30
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.00 1.35 0.50 4.95 1.95 8.80
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.05 0.70 0.85 4.70 2.00 8.90
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.10 0.45 0.85 4.15 2.00 7.30
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.15 0.60 1.00 4.30 2.60 8.10
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.10 0.55 1.00 3.95 2.65 6.85
Propensity Score Matching (5 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.20 0.35 2.00 2.20 4.20 5.75
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.85 0.15 3.05 1.60 5.35 4.05
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.90 0.10 3.55 1.60 6.30 3.95
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.40 0.10 4.25 1.70 6.75 3.65
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.90 0.10 4.50 1.50 7.50 3.30
All in Caliper 1.95 0.05 5.00 0.95 8.40 2.70
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.35 0.15 2.25 2.40 4.85 5.70
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Table 1.6 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.45 0.30 3.10 1.90 6.05 4.85
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.70 0.00 3.25 1.60 6.40 4.30
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.95 0.00 3.70 1.25 6.35 4.00
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.10 0.10 3.75 1.15 6.65 4.20
Propensity Score Matching (7 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.20 0.20 1.70 1.90 4.30 4.65
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.65 0.20 2.60 1.95 5.30 4.80
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.40 0.10 3.20 1.70 5.85 4.05
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.75 0.05 3.95 1.55 6.85 4.35
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.75 0.05 4.30 1.45 7.15 3.95
All in Caliper 0.95 0.00 4.90 1.30 7.80 3.50
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.45 0.35 2.20 2.90 4.05 6.65
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.60 0.20 2.50 2.60 4.85 6.45
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.55 0.15 2.55 2.40 5.15 5.55
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Table 1.6 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.65 0.10 2.90 2.00 5.35 5.70
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.70 0.00 3.20 2.00 6.05 5.40
Conventional Methods
Control Firm LBT Control Firm 0.00 1.95 0.40 7.95 1.10 14.10
5 Random Control Firms 0.10 0.75 1.45 4.25 2.95 8.20
Ibbotson’s RATS 0.00 11.95 0.05 30.15 0.10 42.35
Calendar Time Portfolios Equal Weghted w/ FF 4-factor 0.00 18.80 0.00 42.40 0.00 56.65
Value Weighted w/ FF 4-factor 0.00 1.05 0.30 4.90 1.05 10.10
60-Month Returns
Propensity Score Matching (3 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.10 1.00 0.60 5.20 1.80 8.85
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.20 0.55 0.75 3.65 2.45 8.05
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.10 0.65 1.05 3.05 2.95 6.65
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.15 0.45 0.95 2.65 3.10 5.75
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Table 1.6 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.15 0.40 1.45 2.65 3.85 5.45
All in Caliper 0.95 0.25 3.20 1.90 5.90 4.70
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.00 1.35 0.50 4.60 1.70 8.75
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.00 0.90 0.95 4.90 2.15 9.05
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.05 0.75 0.80 3.65 2.30 8.40
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.10 0.70 0.85 3.35 2.50 7.45
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.25 0.65 1.15 3.65 2.60 6.85
Propensity Score Matching (5 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.20 0.35 2.05 2.30 4.25 5.05
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.40 0.15 2.10 1.85 4.05 4.50
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.95 0.10 2.65 1.60 5.50 3.80
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.95 0.25 3.20 1.20 5.80 3.30
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.00 0.20 3.20 1.20 6.50 3.70
All in Caliper 1.65 0.20 4.80 0.75 8.15 2.60
Continued on Next Page. . .
70
Table 1.6 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.30 0.50 2.05 2.45 3.65 4.95
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.15 0.45 1.75 1.90 4.50 4.25
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.30 0.25 1.80 1.65 4.05 4.65
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.40 0.25 2.35 2.25 4.80 4.90
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.45 0.25 2.20 1.90 4.60 4.55
Propensity Score Matching (7 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.20 0.40 1.80 2.35 3.90 5.35
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.65 0.15 2.65 2.30 5.05 5.45
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.70 0.25 3.10 2.25 5.75 5.90
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.10 0.15 3.30 1.75 6.00 4.65
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.00 0.15 3.50 1.45 6.50 4.00
All in Caliper 1.40 0.15 4.20 1.00 7.45 3.25
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.25 0.55 2.00 2.75 4.05 6.25
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.50 0.20 1.80 2.20 4.20 5.65
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Table 1.6 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.50 0.20 2.20 2.00 3.95 5.15
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.55 0.25 2.45 2.20 4.30 4.95
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.65 0.25 2.10 2.00 4.15 4.75
Conventional Methods
Control Firm LBT Control Firm 0.00 1.95 0.25 7.45 1.10 12.60
5 Random Control Firms 0.15 1.15 0.90 4.90 2.15 10.10
Ibbotson’s RATS 0.00 13.10 0.00 31.40 0.00 43.80
Calendar Time Portfolios Equal Weghted w/ FF 4-factor 0.00 17.20 0.00 36.95 0.25 49.70
Value Weighted w/ FF 4-factor 0.25 2.90 1.50 8.60 2.95 14.70
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Table 1.7: Specification Tests - Time-Clustered Samples
We select 200 firms on a randomly picked year from our sample and assign each of these an event. For each event, we assign an event month of
January. This produces time clustered samples. We then calculate long-run abnormal returns using the methods tabulated below. We repeat this
exercise 2,000 times and compute the percentage of t-statistics from each method that falls in the 5%, 2.5%, or 0.5% tails on the left and right
sides of the corresponding t-distribution. For propensity score matching, we use a caliper of 0.01 standard deviations of the predicted values from
the corresponding logistic regression to select our matches from. If this doesn’t produce any matches, we use an additional caliper of 0.02 standard
deviations from which one match is selected. The variables used to calculate estimated propensity scores are Size, Book-Market, Momentum, Leverage,
and Return on Assets, and their squares.
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
12-Month Returns
Propensity Score Matching (5 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.75 0.80 3.75 2.45 6.40 5.55
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.10 0.45 4.05 2.30 7.35 4.65
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.35 0.25 4.10 1.75 6.85 4.20
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.45 0.20 4.40 1.25 7.75 3.65
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.35 0.25 4.95 1.55 8.05 3.60
All in Caliper 2.05 0.05 5.30 1.45 8.70 3.00
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.60 0.25 2.80 2.30 6.60 4.75
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.30 0.10 4.85 1.60 8.15 3.85
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 1.7 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.55 0.05 5.90 1.85 9.50 3.85
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.75 0.10 6.30 2.00 10.60 3.95
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 2.00 0.10 6.85 1.80 11.20 4.05
Conventional Methods
Control Firm LBT Control Firm 0.75 0.40 3.25 2.00 6.10 4.60
5 Random Control Firms 1.65 0.30 4.05 1.20 7.05 3.15
Ibbotson’s RATS 8.75 49.80 15.40 57.90 18.85 60.75
Calendar Time Portfolios Equal Weghted w/ FF 4-factor 0.45 1.00 2.00 6.05 3.80 10.20
Value Weighted w/ FF 4-factor 0.50 0.45 2.20 2.30 4.75 5.20
36-Month Returns
Propensity Score Matching (5 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.35 0.30 2.20 2.35 4.70 4.65
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.75 0.30 3.35 1.95 6.20 4.70
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.80 0.20 3.35 1.95 6.80 3.95
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 1.7 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.00 0.15 4.30 1.95 7.50 4.00
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.35 0.15 4.95 1.60 8.15 3.70
All in Caliper 2.40 0.00 6.75 1.00 10.15 2.90
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.30 0.35 2.15 2.25 5.25 5.35
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.70 0.30 3.50 1.55 6.00 3.95
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.00 0.10 3.80 1.85 7.40 3.75
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.25 0.00 4.60 1.45 7.55 3.80
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.45 0.00 5.05 1.50 8.00 3.85
Conventional Methods
Control Firm LBT Control Firm 0.25 0.50 1.95 2.70 4.65 5.30
5 Random Control Firms 1.45 0.15 3.90 1.60 6.45 4.20
Ibbotson’s RATS 0.20 74.75 0.40 79.95 0.85 82.30
Calendar Time Portfolios Equal Weghted w/ FF 4-factor 0.10 8.05 0.40 24.05 1.50 34.05
Value Weighted w/ FF 4-factor 0.10 0.55 1.20 2.55 2.65 5.35
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 1.7 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
60-Month Returns
Propensity Score Matching (5 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.25 0.20 2.10 2.25 5.20 5.10
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.35 0.20 2.50 2.00 5.65 4.80
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.65 0.10 3.00 1.70 6.50 4.45
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.10 0.05 4.00 1.60 7.30 4.10
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.35 0.10 4.35 1.90 8.60 4.05
All in Caliper 2.75 0.05 7.70 0.85 11.75 2.90
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.05 0.35 2.30 2.35 4.90 4.90
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.45 0.15 2.60 1.70 5.55 4.40
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.80 0.10 3.85 1.45 7.15 3.95
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.20 0.00 4.45 1.25 8.00 3.60
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.25 0.00 4.85 1.20 8.65 3.70
Conventional Methods
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 1.7 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
Control Firm LBT Control Firm 0.10 0.45 2.25 2.35 4.75 5.45
5 Random Control Firms 1.20 0.05 5.00 1.70 8.05 3.55
Ibbotson’s RATS 3.60 82.70 4.35 87.00 4.45 88.70
Calendar Time Portfolios Equal Weghted w/ FF 4-factor 0.00 18.75 0.10 40.85 0.40 51.40
Value Weighted w/ FF 4-factor 0.25 0.75 1.45 3.60 2.75 7.40
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Table 1.8: Specification Tests - Serial-Correlated Samples
We randomly select 100 firm-years from our sample and assign each of these an event. For each such event, we impose another event on the firm in
the following calendar year. The event month is constrained to January. We then calculate long-run abnormal returns using the methods tabulated
below. We repeat this exercise 2,000 times and compute the percentage of t-statistics from each method that falls in the 5%, 2.5%, or 0.5% tails on the
left and right sides of the corresponding t-distribution. For propensity score matching, we use a caliper of 0.01 standard deviations of the predicted
values from the corresponding logistic regression to select our matches from. If this doesn’t produce any matches, we use an additional caliper of 0.02
standard deviations from which one match is selected. The variables used to calculate estimated propensity scores are Size, Book-Market, Momentum,
Leverage, and Return on Assets, and their squares.
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
12-Month Returns
Propensity Score Matching (5 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.40 0.55 2.30 2.80 4.90 5.05
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.60 0.25 3.00 2.00 5.65 4.10
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.00 0.10 3.70 1.45 6.85 3.40
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.90 0.05 4.10 1.35 7.50 3.25
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.05 0.05 4.50 1.05 7.45 3.40
All in Caliper 1.65 0.00 5.25 0.95 9.05 3.00
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.25 0.50 1.85 2.65 4.25 5.35
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.60 0.20 3.15 2.95 5.40 6.05
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 1.8 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.60 0.10 3.55 2.05 6.00 4.75
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.75 0.00 4.00 1.75 6.35 4.55
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.95 0.05 3.55 1.65 6.65 4.60
Conventional Methods
Control Firm LBT Control Firm 0.60 0.50 3.00 2.35 4.85 5.55
5 Random Control Firms 0.90 0.00 4.50 1.25 8.55 3.20
Ibbotson’s RATS 0.00 0.90 0.25 6.00 0.85 11.50
Calendar Time Portfolios Equal Weghted w/ FF 4-factor 0.00 4.60 0.15 14.00 0.25 24.85
Value Weighted w/ FF 4-factor 0.35 0.55 2.15 1.80 4.05 4.35
36-Month Returns
Propensity Score Matching (5 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.55 0.75 3.85 2.85 7.65 5.60
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.25 0.60 4.40 2.90 8.65 6.25
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 2.20 0.40 6.25 2.65 10.10 4.90
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 1.8 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 2.70 0.40 7.05 2.10 11.35 5.05
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 2.90 0.35 8.55 2.10 12.25 4.55
All in Caliper 5.70 0.30 10.95 1.55 15.45 3.65
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.60 0.50 3.60 3.05 6.95 6.25
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.00 0.65 3.90 2.75 7.65 6.50
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.60 0.50 5.40 3.00 9.55 6.25
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 2.00 0.40 6.40 2.50 10.35 5.65
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 2.55 0.40 6.75 2.00 10.65 5.70
Conventional Methods
Control Firm LBT Control Firm 0.95 0.60 3.75 2.80 6.80 6.30
5 Random Control Firms 2.30 0.50 6.95 1.85 11.35 4.35
Ibbotson’s RATS 0.05 8.60 0.55 20.50 1.10 29.85
Calendar Time Portfolios Equal Weghted w/ FF 4-factor 0.00 7.95 0.00 22.25 0.15 34.70
Value Weighted w/ FF 4-factor 0.40 0.75 2.25 3.05 4.70 5.30
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 1.8 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
60-Month Returns
Propensity Score Matching (5 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.70 0.80 3.30 3.05 6.10 5.80
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.70 0.55 5.45 3.20 8.40 5.90
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 2.30 0.40 6.40 2.30 9.95 6.25
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 2.45 0.35 7.75 2.55 11.80 5.25
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 3.05 0.25 8.15 2.10 12.15 5.00
All in Caliper 6.75 0.20 13.40 1.60 17.70 3.35
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.65 0.50 2.95 2.70 6.00 6.25
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.80 0.45 4.30 3.15 7.35 6.85
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 1.60 0.35 5.35 2.85 9.15 5.90
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 2.20 0.30 6.55 2.70 9.95 5.95
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 2.70 0.40 7.05 2.55 11.40 5.50
Conventional Methods
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 1.8 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
Control Firm LBT Control Firm 0.85 0.90 2.75 3.25 6.65 6.65
5 Random Control Firms 2.55 0.50 7.70 2.25 11.85 4.90
Ibbotson’s RATS 0.05 13.70 0.15 28.65 0.65 38.95
Calendar Time Portfolios Equal Weghted w/ FF 4-factor 0.00 11.20 0.05 27.25 0.20 38.45
Value Weighted w/ FF 4-factor 0.45 1.05 2.25 3.85 4.45 7.20
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Figure 1.1: Simulated Biased Distribution of Observed Covariate
This figure shows the empirical distribution of the observable X for 10,000 units in simulated data,
with a quarter of the units randomly assigned to the treatment group. X for each control unit
is drawn from an N(0, 1) distribution, while X for each treated unit is drawn from an N(1, 1)
distribution.





















Figure 1.2: Simulated Biased Distribution of Outcome
This figure shows the empirical distribution of the outcome Y for 10,000 units in simulated data, with
a quarter of the units randomly assigned to the treatment group. X for each control unit is drawn
from an N(0, 1) distribution, while X for each treated unit is drawn from an N(1, 1) distribution.
Y is generated according to Yi = Ti + Xi + i, where Ti denotes treatment status and i is drawn
from N(0, 0.05).





















Figure 1.3: Outcome for Simulated Dataset
This figure shows the outcome Y for 10,000 units in simulated data as a function of the observed
covariate X, with a quarter of the units randomly assigned to the treatment group. X for each
control unit is drawn from an N(0, 1) distribution, while X for each treated unit is drawn from an
N(1, 1) distribution. Y is generated according to Yi = Ti +Xi + i, where Ti denotes treatment
status and i is drawn from N(0, 0.05).

















Figure 1.4: Number of Matches within Caliper
This figure shows the number of matches that are obtained through propensity score matching on
random samples within a specified caliper. We use an initial caliper of 0.01 standard deviations
of the estimated propensity scores (the predicted values of the logistic regression). If no match is
found, we use a secondary caliper of 0.02 standard deviations and select the closest match. The
horizontal axis shows the number of matches. The vertical column shows the relative frequency
as a percentage, with the final bar showing the frequency for >100 matches. The total number of





















Figure 1.5: Empirical Distribution of 12-month Buy-and-Hold Returns
This figure shows the empirical distribution of 12-month buy-and-hold returns for single firms and
5-firm portfolios. The data are generated using the CRSP monthly database from 1984-2004. For
single firms, 10,000 observation points (firm-months) are randomly chosen and the 12-month buy-
and-hold returns are calculated for the corresponding firm starting from that month. For 5-firm
portfolios, the above process is repeated 5 times and the arithmetic mean is calculated over the 5
iterations generating 10,000 values of average 12-month buy-and-hold returns. The horizontal axis
denotes the return (-100% - 500%) while the vertical axis shows the estimated density using kernel
density estimation. The distribution extends a little to the left of -1 due to the estimation process;
the actual data stops at -1.



















Figure 1.6: Empirical Distribution of 36-month Buy-and-Hold Returns
This figure shows the empirical distribution of 36-month buy-and-hold returns for single firms and
5-firm portfolios. The data are generated using the CRSP monthly database from 1984-2004. For
single firms, 10,000 observation points (firm-months) are randomly chosen and the 36-month buy-
and-hold returns are calculated for the corresponding firm starting from that month. For 5-firm
portfolios, the above process is repeated 5 times and the arithmetic mean is calculated over the 5
iterations generating 10,000 values of average 36-month buy-and-hold returns. The horizontal axis
denotes the return (-100% - 500%) while the vertical axis shows the estimated density using kernel
density estimation. The distribution extends a little to the left of -1 due to the estimation process;
the actual data stops at -1.





















Figure 1.7: Empirical Distribution of 60-month Buy-and-Hold Returns
This figure shows the empirical distribution of 60-month buy-and-hold returns for single firms and
5-firm portfolios. The data are generated using the CRSP monthly database from 1984-2004. For
single firms, 10,000 observation points (firm-months) are randomly chosen and the 60-month buy-
and-hold returns are calculated for the corresponding firm starting from that month. For 5-firm
portfolios, the above process is repeated 5 times and the arithmetic mean is calculated over the 5
iterations generating 10,000 values of average 60-month buy-and-hold returns. The horizontal axis
denotes the return (-100% - 500%) while the vertical axis shows the estimated density using kernel
density estimation. The distribution extends a little to the left of -1 due to the estimation process;
the actual data stops at -1.





















Figure 1.8: Power in Random Samples
This figure shows the power of various techniques in detecting induced abnormal returns in random
samples. For each iteration in Table 1.3 we increase(decrease) the 12-month buy-and-hold return
by a fixed amount for each event. We then check for the fraction of t-statistics in each method that
fall in the right(left) 5% tail of the corresponding t-distribution; i.e. we check for power at the 5%
significance level using a 1-tailed t-test. The induced returns are from 0 to +(-)10%. For propensity
score matching, we use the Mahalanobis metric.


























According to Securities Data Corporation’s Mergers & Acquisition database, the last
five years have seen U.S. corporations announce share repurchase programs at esti-
mated values of more than $300 bn on an average annually, at least 90% of which were
open-market. There are contending theories for the motivation behind the increas-
ing use of share repurchase programs. One suggests that managers use changes in
payout policy to convey information about future performance (Miller & Modigliani
(1961), Miller & Rock (1985)). However, as documented by Gong et al. (2008),
evidence pointing in this direction could be a result of earnings management in the
quarter prior to a repurchase announcement, because of which subsequent quarters
appear particularly good. A competing theory states that firms, in a bid to avoid
value-destroying activities, distribute cash flow in excess of their investment oppor-
tunities via changes in payout policy that may involve repurchase programs (Jensen
91
(1986)). Grullon and Michaely (2002) find evidence in support of this theory in the
form of lowered systematic risk following repurchases. In a survey of 384 financial
executives, Brav et al. (2005) attempt to unearth the true underlying motivation
through in-depth interviews asking managers a range of questions about their payout
policies. In this survey, about 85% of the managers expressed the belief that there
are negative consequences to reducing dividends and that it is essential to maintain
consistency with prior policy regarding dividends. The corresponding number for
repurchases as a payout tool was around 20%. Regardless of the underlying cause,
repurchases are thus seen as a more flexible alternative to dividends when decisions
about payouts are made. More importantly, Brav et al. (2005) also report that
almost 90% of the managers surveyed strongly agreed with announcing repurchases
when the market price of the stock is below its perceived true value. In addition,
there are several studies that confirm managers’ ability to time the market with re-
purchase announcements. This is most often done by examining returns of stocks for
up to five years after the announcement. Ikenberry et al. (1995) examine long-run
performance of stocks following open-market share repurchases for the period 1980-
1990 and find that the post-announcement average abnormal buy-and-hold return
over the next four years is 12.1%. Using data on open market programs announced
by firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange from 1989 to 1997, Ikenberry et al.
(2000) find abnormal returns of 0.59% per month over a three-year period following
the announcement. McNally and Smith (2007) use a unique Canadian dataset of all
repurchase programs by firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange from 1987 to
2000 and document 4-6% annual abnormal returns over a three-year period. How-
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ever, these returns vanished upon excluding penny stocks. Chan et al. (2007), using
U.S. repurchase announcements from 1980 to 1996, finds buy-and-hold abnormal re-
turns of 24% and monthly abnormal returns of about 0.3% over a four-year period.
Gong et al. (2008) find significant negative correlation between pre-announcement
abnormal accruals and post-announcement long-run returns. Peyer and Vermaelen
(2009) conduct their analysis for U.S. repurchases confirmed by LexisNexis from 1991
to 2001 and document 2.67%, 10.54%, 18.60%, and 24.25% cumulative abnormal re-
turns over one, two, three, and four years respectively, and corresponding monthly
abnormal returns ranging from 0.45-0.55%. Overall, there seems to be substantial ev-
idence in support of managers’ ability to time the market by identifying undervalued
stocks. An important piece of evidence against this effect was documented by Gong
et al. (2008) who found that downward earnings management before the repurchase
announcement has a significant negative association with future stock performance.
This chapter is an attempt at a more accurate calculation of long-run abnormal
returns following open-market share repurchases. We identify certain characteristics
that are more common among repurchasing firms. We document that firms announc-
ing repurchases are larger, are rarely in the top book-to-market decile and have usually
had high return on assets (calculated using net income) in the prior calendar year.
We form an aggregated measure using the three variables just mentioned and assign
events to specific quantiles of this new variable. The results of these simulations
suggest that the best approach to calculating long-run abnormal returns in this case
is matching based on propensity scores, Consequently, we do find the presence of
buy-and-hold abnormal returns of about 3%, 7.5%, and 12% over one-, three-, and
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five-year periods. These returns are much smaller compared to that documented in
prior studies. In addition, practically all of the abnormal returns are concentrated
amongst firms that fall in the bottom half of ROA, which could tie in with the findings
of Gong et al.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section
3 discusses the methodology and the results. Concluding remarks are offered in
Section 4.
2.2 Data
Our initial sample consists of all U.S. repurchases present in SDC Platinum’s Mergers
& Acquisitions database classified as ‘Open’. The entire database spans 1980 to 2009,
while repurchases classified as open-market begin in 1984. Since we focus on long-run
returns for up to five years, we restrict our sample to Dec-2004. In addition, we
require that:
• The firm must be present in CRSP with a share code of 10 or 11 (ordinary
common shares) and an exchange code of 1, 2. or 3 (NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq)
at the time of announcement, as well as have a market value as of December of
the prior year.
• The firm must be present in Compustat Annual Database with non-missing
Assets (AT), Common/Ordinary Equity (CEQ), Liabilities (LT), Cash & Short
Term Investments (CHE), Net Income (NI), and Total Sales (SALE) as of De-
cember1 of the prior year.
1In most cases we do find balance sheet data reported in December. Otherwise, we select the
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These criteria give us 7,377 repurchase announcements from 1984 to 2004. Dittmar
(2000) finds, using a Tobit model with several variables, that larger firms and firms
with higher cash flow are more likely to repurchase stock. She also finds that firms
use stock repurchases to distribute excess cash to stockholders, after controlling for
investment opportunities, and that a firm’s leverage relative to its target ratio has a
minor but significant effect on repurchase decisions. On the other hand, Ikenberry et
al. (1995, 2000) and Peyer & Vermaelen (2000) find that value stocks generate the
highest long-run abnormal returns following announcement. If managers do possess
market timing skills, this raises the possibility that firms with high book-to-market
values may be more likely to announce repurchase programs to take advantage of
potentially higher mispricing.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics of repurchasing firms compared to non-repurchasing
firms in terms of various firm characteristics. Each of these variables is normalized
to have a zero-mean and unit-standard deviation for easier interpretation. We retain
these variables in this form for the remainder of the study. We classify a firm as
‘Repurchasing’ at December of a particular year if it has at least one repurchasing
announcement during the next calendar year. Otherwise, the firm is classified as
‘Non-Repurchasing’.
As seen, all six variables are significantly different between the repurchasing and
non-repurchasing samples. Among the six, based on the magnitude of the t-statistics,
three factors appear to be more important: size, book-market, and ROA. The t-
statistic for the difference in means of book-market ratio between the two samples
closest available month in the same calendar year.
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is -26.5 and that for ROA is 53.4. The value for size isn’t as high at 12, but that
is likely to be caused by the extreme skewness of the size variable. To get a better
understanding of the distribution of the variables across the two samples, we look
at Table 2.2. This table presents the fraction of repurchasing firms (in %) in each
decile of the individual firm characteristics. The decile cut-off points are estimated
separately for each year. The top row shows that 2.2% of the firms in the repurchasing
sample lie in the lowest size decile. This number steadily increases to 20.5% of the
repurchasing firms in the highest size decile. Clearly, larger firms are more likely to
issue a repurchase announcement. The second row shows that firms with very high
or very low book-market ratios are unlikely to announce a repurchase program, since
the lowest and the highest book-market deciles contain only 7.1% and 4.6% of the
firms respectively. The top two ROA deciles contain almost 30% of the repurchasing
firms, while the bottom two deciles contain only about 5%, implying that firms with
high ROA are more likely to announce repurchases. There isn’t as distinctive a
pattern for the remaining variables as for the three just described. For leverage, the
decile with the highest concentration of firms has 12%, while the decile with the
lowest concentration of firms has 8%, making the difference 4%. The corresponding
difference for the cash variable is 4.4%, and that for tat is 3.3%.
We interpret these observations to mean that repurchasing firms are more likely to
be large and highly profitable, and they are less likely to have extreme book-market
values, especially on the higher side. Using this interpretation, we construct a new
variable Vnet as size + roa - book −market. The distribution of repurchasing firms
across deciles of Vnet is shown in the last row of Table 2.2. Clearly, as Vnet for a firm
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gets higher, it is more likely to announce a repurchase.
2.3 Methodology & Results
2.3.1 Sample Characteristics
Based on the univariate analysis in the preceding section, we found that firms with
high values of size and ROA are more likely and firms with high values of book-market
are less likely to announce repurchase programs. Other variables, namely leverage,
cash, and TAT also influenced likelihood of participation in a repurchase, but not
to the same extent. We now confirm these observations using the following logistic
regression:























where Trit = 1 denotes participation in a repurchase announcement by firm i in year
t. This is shown in Table 2.3. We present results from a completely linear model
as well for comparison. Since the variables are all normalized to the same scale, the
estimates can be used to compare the relative importance of each in the estimation
of the predicted probability.1 We see that allowing for non-linearities in the model
significantly alters the estimates of some of the coefficients. The estimate for size
increases by 4 times, the estimate for book market increases by about 25% and the
estimate of ROA increases by about 25% as well. The estimate for cash changes sign,
1The precise distributions are, of course, different. Any interpretations drawn based on these
estimates are therefore only approximate.
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while the other two coefficient estimates undergo smaller changes. Furthermore, the
squared terms are all highly significant. We proceed with the non-linear model for the
rest of the analysis. We should note, however, that since for most of the observations,
the values of the independent variables lie between -1 and 1, the effect of the squared
terms is only felt on a small portion of the population. This is clearly evident for the
size variable for which the maximum value in the population is 68, but about 98%
of the size values lie between -0.15 and 1. Since the maximum value for repurchasing
firms is 32, the regression model tries to reduce the sum of squared errors by lowering
the estimate of the coefficient, as seen in the estimate of size for the linear model.
Thus, having the squared term can significantly improve the estimate of the linear
term, particularly by picking up extreme values in either direction (or both, as in the
case of book −market).
In this model, the estimates for the coefficients of size, book-market, and ROA are
much larger in magnitude than the rest of the variables. To obtain a probabilistic
interpretation of these estimates, we plot the predicted values probability obtained
using the regression estimates on the mean values of the corresponding variables
within deciles of the three independent variables mentioned above. This is shown in
Figure 2.1. The graph for size shows that in the lowest size decile, the average firm,
with values of independent variables determined by the mean values of the variables
for all firm-years within that size decile,2 has a probability of 3.2% of participating in
a repurchase program. On the other hand, the average firm in the highest size decile
has a probability of 12.8%. Similarly, the average firm in the lowest ROA decile has
2The values for the squared terms are obtained by squaring the mean values.
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a probability of participation of 0.5%, which gets inflated to 13.3% in the highest
decile. For an average firm in the second or third book market decile, the predicted
probability is close to 8%, while in the highest decile this gets reduced to 3%. We
therefore obtain a similar picture to what was earlier seen in the univariate analysis.
We also see that when the deciles are divided according to the constructed variable
Vnet, the predicted probability for an average firm goes from 0.6% in the lowest decile
to 15.5% in the highest decile. There are 9,514 observations in the highest Vnet decile.
Of these, 1,424 observations were associated with a repurchase announcement. This
amounts to 15%, which is very close to the value obtained from the logistic regression
estimate for an averge firm in the top Vnet decile as seen in the plot. This can be taken
as evidence in favor of the regression model and the predicted values are assumed to
be good estimates of propensity scores.
2.3.2 Cluster Tests
We saw in Table 2.2 that almost 20% of the repurchase sample comes from the top
Vnet decile, i.e. firms with high values of size and ROA and low values of book-market.
Firms with such characteristics have a 15.5% probability of announcing a repurchase,
which is much higher compared to the average firm’s 6.8% probability. This shows
that repurchasing firms form non-random clusters based on these characteristics. In
Section 1.5.2 on page 34, we tested on two kinds of arbitrarily selected clusters for
the performance of several methods of calculating long-run abnormal returns. Since
we are able, in case of repurchasing firms, to identify a clustering scheme, we perform
similar tests on small samples randomly chosen from the same cluster. Similar to
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what we did earlier, we randomly pick 200 firm-year observations from the highest
Vnet decile and assign them an event. We then calculate t-statistics using various
methods of calculating abnormal returns over 12-, 36-, and 60-months. This procedure
is repeated 2,000 times. We use the predicted values from the logistic regression of
Table 2.3 as the estimated propensity scores. To calculate the Mahalanobis distance,
we use all 6 firm characteristics and the procedure explained on page 24.
Results of the specification tests are presented in Table 2.4. We see that almost
all the propensity score matching methods are well specified and quite close to the
theoretical significance limits. An exception is the All in Caliper rule, which owing
to the large number of nearest neighbors is negatively skewed. Importantly, with one
and two neighbors, we get good results with both the propensity score distance and
the Mahalanobis metric. LBT’s control firm, based on size and book-market, provides
t-statistics with a positive skewness. 8.9% of the t-statistics fall in the right 5% tail,
while 5.2% fall in the right 2.5% tail for 12-month returns. T-statistics for 36-month
returns are similarly skewed as well. There is also an under-representation of values
in the left tail, with only about 2% of the t-statistics falling below the 5th percentile.
The RATS method and the calendar time method with both equal and value weighted
portfolios yield t-statistics with severe positive skewness – 9.4%, 15.1%, and 23.8%
of the t-statistics from value-weighted calendar time portfolios fall in the right 5%
tail for 12-, 36-, and 60-month returns respectively. Therefore, all the conventional
methods tested here have a positive bias when estimating long-run abnormal returns
on samples derived from firms clustered on high values of Vnet. Since 20% of the
repurchase sample are composed of such firms, there is a strong possibility for each
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of these methods to give positively biased estimates of long-run abnormal returns
following repurchase announcements.
2.3.3 Repurchase Sample
In this subsection, we apply the methods shown and discussed in the prior sections
to estimate long-run abnormal returns of repurchasing firms.
2.3.3.1 Fama-French Regression Methods
Table 2.5 shows the results of using regression-based methods with Fama-French
factors. We use the full sample for Panel A and find very high and statistically
significant abnormal returns using each of the methods. To reduce the effect of very
cheap stocks, we discard the observations from our sample where the stock price at the
month-end prior to announcement was less than or equal to $5. These results are in
Panel B. The values of the abnormal returns decrease slightly but the strength of the
results doesn’t change by much. We get 5.8%, 15.3%, and 21% cumulative abnormal
returns over 12-, 36-, and 60-months respectively using RATS. In earler tests, we saw
that the t-statistics obtained using RATS had a severe positive skewness. So, it is
likely that these values are well above their true limit. With calendar time portfolios,
we get higher abnormal returns using equal weighting than value weighting. This was
expected since in our specification tests we saw that equal weighted portfolios gave
consistently high and skewed t-statistics compared to value weighted portfolios.
Two factors that strongly influence a firm’s decision to participate in a repurchase
program are its size and ROA. We saw in Figure 2.1 that a firm in either the high-
est size decile or the highest ROA decile has about 13% probability of announcing a
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repurchase. Table 2.6 shows the results of the preceding table applied to size deciles.
We group some of the deciles together to obtain a roughly equal number of partic-
ipating observations in each group. With the RATS method, we see much higher
returns for firms in deciles 1 – 8 than for those in the top two deciles, with about
24% compared to 15.6% over 60-months. The opposite is true when using calendar
time portfolios. With value weighting, we get 0.39% per month and highly significant
returns for firms in deciles 9 – 10, 0.2% per month and not very significant returns
for deciles 6 – 8, and no abnormal returns for firms in deciles 1 – 5. Table 2.7 groups
firms into deciles of ROA. Similar to the earlier table, we see that a large contribution
to abnormal returns comes from firms in the top two ROA deciles.
2.3.3.2 LBT Control Firm
Table 2.8 shows the estimates of buy-and-hold abnormal return obtained usign LBT’s
control firm. The abnormal returns estimates for the full sample here are much
lower than those obtained using the Fama-French regression. Because of delisting
repurchasing and control firms, however, we see a large loss in observations from 15%
in 12-months to more than 50% in 60-months. This loss creates a concern regarding
the efficiency of the procedure. Upon omitting repurchasing and control stocks with
pre-announcement price not greater than $5,3 neither the estimate nor the significance
of the returns changes much. Looking into the size and ROA decile groups gives us
interesting results. Within the size decile groups, both the low and mid size groups
contribute significantly to 12-month returns. For 36- and 60-month returns, however,
3Omitting only event firm stocks creates a negative bias.
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while the estimate of the abnormal returns is high, the t-statistic is very low, hinting
at the possible inefficiency of using only one control firm. We get a clearer picture
from the ROA decile groups. Here, it is clear that most of the positive abnormal
returns of repurchasing firms over long horizons can be attributed to the low-ROA
firms.
2.3.3.3 Propensity Score Matching
In our analysis thus far, we have utilized propensity score matching in three related
ways. We initially set up a caliper of radius 0.01 s.d.4 and selected all firms within
this radius as our initial sample. In case we find no match, we expand the radius to
0.02 s.d. and select the closest match in terms of propensity score. The All in Caliper
method uses all the firms in this set as controls. From this set, we then chose one
or more neighbors closest to the event firm in terms of either the propensity score
distance or the Mahalanobis metric. We apply these methods to calculate abnormal
returns for firms in our repurchase sample. Since Size, Book-Market, and ROA play
a much more significant role in determining participation (as seen in the logistic
regression in Table 2.3), we only include these variables in our calculation of the
Mahalanobis distance. We show the results of using up to 3 nearest neighbors using
either metric in Table 2.9. The sample includes event and control firm stocks whose
price at the month-end prior to announcement is at least $5. We see here that there is
a substantial difference between the two metrics. In both cases, increasing the number
of neighbors leads to an increase in the t-statistic for 36- and 60-months, indicating
4Standard deviations of the predicted probabilities from the logistic regression.
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an improvement in efficiency. With three neighbors, the propensity score metric
shows 3.3%, 6.6%, and 17.7% abnormal returns over 12-, 36-, and 60-months, all
significant at the 0.1% level. When all controls within the caliper are included, the 60-
month return becomes 10.8%. This decrease in abnormal returns with higher number
of neighbors was also seen and discussed in the specification tests in Section 1.5.5
Compared to the propensity score metric, the abnormal returns obtained using the
Mahalanobis metric are lower. Using three nearest neighbors, we get 2.2%, 4.8%,
and 10.1% for 12-. 36-, and 60-months respectively, significant at about the 5%
level. In this case, the effect of the negative skewness of abnormal returns with
increasing neighbors seems to be absent. To explore this issue further, we tabulate the
values for abnormal returns using the Mahalanobis metric with one to ten neighbors
in Table 2.10. For 60-month returns, we see that even as an increasing number
of neighbors are added to the control portfolio, the value of the abnormal returns
doesn’t change beyond the 9–10% interval. This behavior is in stark contrast to
what we evidenced earlier, and also very different from the results we get using the
propensity score metric. Since the neighbors in both cases are picked from the same
set of controls within the caliper, the difference in results must caused by the order in
which neighbors are added. The Mahalanobis metric, therefore, appears to be more
successful in identifying good controls.
We now compare the quality of these matches amongst themselves and against
LBT’s control firm match. To do this, we calculate the difference in the six firm
5In unreported results, we found that the abnormal returns over 60-months decreases steadily
from 17.7% with 3 neighbors to 12.3% with 10 neighbors, leading more credibility to our earlier
claims about potential problems associated with using large number of neighbors.
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characteristics used to predict propensity scores between each repurchasing firm and
its corresponding control firm(s) using each method. We use three nearest neighbors
where applicable. We then map the distribution of these differences and plot the
values at decile breakpoints. These plots are in Fig 2.2–Fig 2.7. For instance, in Fig-
ure 2.2 we see that at the 1st percentile, the difference in size between a repurchasing
and its control firm using LBT’s method is -0.5 standard deviations of size.
Figure 2.2 shows the difference in size. As expected, LBT’s method controls
explicitly for size and is thus very well matched. The other methods do quite well
and the only disparities we see are at the 1% level. In Figure 2.3, LBT’s method again
does very well since it incorporates book-market explicitly as well. The Mahalanobis
metric also controls well for book-market, with the difference being only about 0.15
s.d. at the 10th and 90th percentiles. In Figure 2.4, the Mahalanobis metric matches
leverage better than the other three. Mahalanobis metric also controls very well for
ROA which is one of the factors used to calculate the Mahalanobis distance. This
can be seen in Figure 2.5. We also see that LBT’s method has issues with matching
for ROA at the extreme percentiles. Figure 2.6 shows there’s not much difference
in matching for cash amongst the four methods. Figure 2.7 shows another scenario
where the Mahalanobis metric does much better than the other three methods.
Therefore, the initial caliper extracts all the benefit of using propensity scores. In
almost every instance in the figures discussed above, there is no material difference
between the set of matches picked out by the caliper and the three nearest neighbors
chosen in terms of propensity scores. On the other hand, if the three nearest neighbors
are chosen based on the Mahalanobis distance, we see a tangible improvement in the
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quality of matches. For further analysis, therefore, we strongly recommend using the
Mahalanobis metric to select three nearest neighbors and calculate abnormal returns.
Next, we break the repurchase sample into groups of deciles of size and ROA and
calculate abnormal returns within each group. The results are in Table 2.11. We see
that the abnormal returns observed on the full sample are caused almost exclusively
by firms in the lower size and ROA decile groups. The ROA decile groups provide the
clearest picture, with zero abnormal returns over 36- and 60-months for firms in the
top two deciles. This is also evidence of the matching capability of the Mahalanobis
metric.
2.4 Conclusions
We saw definitive evidence showing that the method used to calculate long-run ab-
normal returns plays an overwhelming role in the estimates we obtain. Using Fama-
French regressions, we saw hgh abnormal returns over every time horizon. Ibbotson’s
RATS method gave us an estimate of 21% over 60-months, while with equal weighted
calendar time portfolios we get about 0.5% per month over each time horizon. The
RATS estimate is lower than that reported by Peyer & Vermaelen (2009), but the
calendar time estimate is almost exactly the same. Some difference is expected since
their sample is from 1991–20016 and they also confirm each announcement in their
sample using LexisNexis. We showed in our specification tests that both RATS and
equal weighted calendar time portfolios result in estimates with high positive skew-
ness. When we change the weighting scheme to value weighting, we observe lower but
6Upon restricting our sample to the same time period, the RATS estimate for 3- and 5-year
abnormal returns are about 20% and 27%, which is much closer to their result.
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still highly statistically significant returns. The difference is about 10 b.p. per month
over 5 years. As we’d seen in Table 2.4, even value weighting is positively skewed when
it comes to samples clustered on high size and high ROA, a typical characteristic of
firms that announce repurchase programs. The value weighting scheme is also likely
to be positively biased for the repurchase sample. We confirm this suspicion in Ta-
bles 2.6 and 2.7 where we see that the value weighting method reports high abnormal
returns for the top decile groups—with 0.7% per month over the first year for firms
in the top two ROA deciles. We then used the control firm method proposed by LBT
which is less likely to be skewed on the repurchase sample compared to the regression
methods. While we do obtain lower estimates of abnormal returns, the single control
firm causes a loss in efficiency. The estimate for 36-months isn’t significant at the 5%
level, and for the 60-month estimate we end up losing more than half of our sample.
This inefficiency adds uncertainty to the estimates provided by this procedure.
We then estimated abnormal returns using propensity matching. In our specifi-
cation tests, we didn’t observe any material difference in the results provided by a
propensity score metric and the Mahalanobis metric. However, the estimates or long-
run abnormal returns obtained for the repurchase sample are very different. With
three neighbors and the propensity score metric, we get 17.7% abnormal return over
60-months compared to about 10% using the Mahalanobis metric. Upon including
all the controls in our initial caliper for each event firm, we observe a 10% return as
well and also notice that as we increase the number of neighbors, the propensity score
metric estimate decreases. This, of course, is symptomatic of methods using multiple
control firms, as was discusssed earlier. The Mahalanobis metric, while exhibiting the
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same symptoms in our specification tests, is a lot more consistent on the repurchase
sample. Even changing the number of neighbors from 1 to 10 causes only minor
fluctuations in the 5-year abnormal return estimate in the range of 9–10%. Further
investigations reveal that the quality of matches obtained by matching on the Ma-
halanobis metric is much better than that obtained using either the propensity score
metric or the LBT control firm. Due to this, we achieve higher efficiency without a
compromise on bias, and the 60-month estimate with the Mahalanobis metric and 3
control firms is composed of 50% more observations than the single control firm of
LBT. We also observe that the abnormal returns can be primarily attributed to firms
with lower ROA than the median in a particular year.
We thus conclude that firms announcing open market share repurchase programs
do earn a positive abnormal return over 1, 3, and 5 years. The magnitude of this
return is a lot lower than what has been previously reported. Firms with high size
and high ROA are particularly likely to announce a repurchase program. However,
it is the firms in the lower end of the distribution that earn abnormal returns over
long horizons. A second note of significance is that we are able to demonstrate the
usefulness of the propensity score matching procedure, especially when we employ the
right caliper in conjunction with the Mahalanobis metric. We strongly recommend
incorporating this procedure in studies concerned with long-run returns.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Repurchasing Firms
This table presents summary statistics for Repurchasing and Non-Repurchasing firms. A firm is classified as ”Repurchasing” at December of a
particular year if it has at least one repurchase announcement during the next calendar year. Each of the characteristics presented below has been
normalized to have zero mean and unit standard deviation. The definitions are: Size - Market Value in 1987 Dollars; Book-Market - Ratio of book
to market values of common stock; Leverage Ratio of total liabilities to total assets; ROA - Ratio of net income to total assets; Cash & Short Term
Inv. - Ratio of cash & short term investments to total assets; Total Asset Turnover - Ratio of total sales to total assets. The last column shows
the t-statistic for the difference in means between Repurchasing and Non-Repurchasing firms. ∗, ∗∗ denote significance levels at 5% and 1% using a
two-tailed test.
Repurchasing Firms Non-Repurchasing Firms Mean difference
Min. Median Mean Max. Median Mean t-statistic
Size -0.157 -0.12 0.191 31.78 -0.147 -0.016 12.027∗∗
Book-Market -0.744 -0.235 -0.149 6.102 -0.177 0.013 -26.531∗∗
Leverage -2.094 0.076 0.084 1.903 0.022 -0.007 7.382∗∗
ROA -6.137 0.261 0.277 4.763 0.165 -0.023 53.377∗∗
Cash & Short Term Inv. -0.783 -0.442 -0.078 4.172 -0.432 0.007 -8.003∗∗
Total Asset Turnover -1.119 -0.133 -0.04 12.15 -0.128 0.003 -3.932∗∗
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Table 2.2: Decile Distribution of Repurchasing Firms
This tabble shows the distribution of Repurchasing firms in deciles of the firm characteristics. The decile breakpoints are calculated each year.
Numbers shown are in terms of percentage of the total number of repurchasing announcements. A firm is classified as ”Repurchasing” at December
of a particular year if it has at least one repurchase announcement during the next calendar year. Each of the characteristics presented below has
been normalized to have zero mean and unit standard deviation. The definitions are: Size - Market Value in 1987 Dollars; Book-Market - Ratio
of book to market values of common stock; Leverage Ratio of total liabilities to total assets; ROA - Ratio of net income to total assets; Cash &
Short Term Inv. - Ratio of cash & short term investments to total assets; Total Asset Turnover - Ratio of total sales to total assets; Vnet = Size -
Book-Market + ROA.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Size 2.2 4.7 6.1 8 9.2 9.6 11 12.7 16.1 20.5
Book-Market 7.1 10.9 11.6 11.6 11.7 11.3 11.3 10.6 9.4 4.6
Leverage 8 10.1 10 10.8 9.7 10.6 9 8.1 11.7 12
ROA 1.3 3.9 6 12.6 12.2 10.3 10.8 13.4 14.9 14.6
Cash & Short Term Inv. 7.4 9.8 10.6 11.4 10.9 10.9 10.6 10.2 11.1 7
Total Asset Turnover 11.4 11.3 8.1 8.7 10.5 10.7 10 10.3 9.2 9.8
Vnet 2 3.7 7.4 8.5 10.4 10.2 11.1 12.6 14.8 19.3
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Table 2.3: Logistic Regression predicting Repurchase Announcements
This table presents coefficients and t-statistics for the logistic regression predicting a firm’s
probability to announce a repurchase program. The dependent variable is defined at the firm-year
level and takes on a value of 1 for a repurchasing firm. A firm is classified as ”Repurchasing”
at December of a particular year if it has at least one repurchase announcement during the
next calendar year. Each of the independent variables presented below has been normalized to
have zero mean and unit standard deviation. The definitions are: Size - Market Value in 1987
Dollars; Book-Market - Ratio of book to market values of common stock; Leverage Ratio of total
liabilities to total assets; ROA - Ratio of net income to total assets; Cash & Short Term Inv. -
Ratio of cash & short term investments to total assets; Total Asset Turnover - Ratio of total
sales to total assets. ∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ denote significance levels at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% using a two-tailed test.
Linear Model Non-Linear Model
Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
Size 0.063 8.1∗∗∗ 0.275 13.1∗∗∗
Size2 -0.012 -8.1∗∗∗
Book Market -0.43 -15.9∗∗∗ -0.313 -8.8∗∗∗
Book Market2 -0.076 -2.9∗∗
Leverage 0.102 6.8∗∗∗ 0.095 6.2∗∗∗
Leverage2 0.052 3.8∗∗∗
ROA 0.783 28.9∗∗∗ 0.987 26∗∗∗
ROA2 -0.217 -8.6∗∗∗
Cash -0.04 -2.5∗ 0.077 3∗∗
Cash2 -0.058 -4.7∗∗∗
TAT -0.164 -10.8∗∗∗ -0.149 -9∗∗∗
TAT 2 0.002 2.8∗∗∗
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Table 2.4: Specification Tests - Vnet-Clustered Samples
We select 200 firm-year observations from the highest Vnet decile and assign each of these an event. For each event, we assign an event month of
January. This produces non-random Vnet-clustered samples. We then calculate long-run abnormal returns using the methods tabulated below. We
repeat this exercise 2,000 times and compute the percentage of t-statistics from each method that falls in the 5%, 2.5%, or 0.5% tails on the left and
right sides of the corresponding t-distribution. For propensity score matching, we use a caliper of 0.01 standard deviations of the predicted values from
the corresponding logistic regression to select our matches from. If this doesn’t produce any matches, we use an additional caliper of 0.02 standard
deviations from which one match is selected. The variables used to calculate estimated propensity scores are Size, Book-Market, Leverage, Return on
Assets, Cash & Cash Equivalents, and Total Asset Turnover and their squares.
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
12-Month Returns
Propensity Score Matching (5 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.30 0.35 2.15 2.75 5.35 4.90
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.75 0.35 3.20 2.10 5.70 4.20
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.70 0.30 2.80 1.90 6.45 4.20
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.60 0.40 3.15 2.35 6.40 4.05
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.75 0.40 3.05 2.25 6.25 4.05
All in Caliper 0.55 0.50 3.20 2.10 6.20 4.60
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.35 0.60 2.20 3.05 4.25 6.60
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.40 0.60 2.00 3.15 4.65 6.10
Continued on Next Page. . .
112
Table 2.4 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.45 0.60 2.35 2.80 4.80 6.05
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.35 0.50 2.40 2.75 5.30 5.55
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.40 0.60 2.75 2.65 5.30 5.65
Conventional Methods
Control Firm LBT Control Firm 0.15 1.35 0.95 5.20 2.55 8.90
5 Random Control Firms 0.15 1.00 1.05 5.15 1.80 10.25
Ibbotson’s RATS 0.05 1.85 0.15 7.10 0.45 13.90
Calendar Time Portfolios Equal Weghted w/ FF 4-factor 0.05 1.90 0.40 9.25 0.80 16.50
Value Weighted w/ FF 4-factor 0.05 0.80 0.40 4.35 0.95 9.40
36-Month Returns
Propensity Score Matching (5 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.20 0.75 2.35 3.00 4.75 5.95
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.40 0.50 2.95 2.45 6.00 4.70
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.60 0.25 3.40 2.05 6.30 4.25
Continued on Next Page. . .
113
Table 2.4 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.75 0.20 3.65 1.95 6.40 4.15
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.70 0.20 3.85 1.90 6.50 4.10
All in Caliper 1.05 0.05 4.50 1.45 7.55 4.00
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.20 0.50 1.95 2.85 4.15 6.55
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.50 0.30 2.10 2.90 4.65 6.75
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.45 0.20 2.35 2.55 4.80 5.80
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.45 0.30 2.70 2.45 4.80 5.65
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.35 0.30 2.45 2.45 4.95 5.75
Conventional Methods
Control Firm LBT Control Firm 0.25 0.95 0.90 3.60 2.15 8.20
5 Random Control Firms 0.20 0.25 2.05 2.35 4.20 4.90
Ibbotson’s RATS 0.00 2.90 0.05 12.60 0.10 22.75
Calendar Time Portfolios Equal Weghted w/ FF 4-factor 0.00 3.85 0.05 14.45 0.10 25.10
Value Weighted w/ FF 4-factor 0.05 2.00 0.30 8.75 0.55 15.10
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 2.4 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
60-Month Returns
Propensity Score Matching (5 Variables)
Propensity Score Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.45 0.40 2.30 2.50 4.80 5.15
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.50 0.60 2.40 1.75 5.30 4.50
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.65 0.20 3.05 1.70 5.95 3.65
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.70 0.25 2.85 1.50 5.95 3.20
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.75 0.15 2.95 1.35 6.00 3.20
All in Caliper 0.95 0.10 3.90 0.85 7.35 2.05
Mahalanobis Distance 1 Nearest Neighbor in Caliper 0.15 0.75 1.65 3.25 3.80 5.85
2 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.45 0.45 1.60 2.65 3.60 5.20
3 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.35 0.40 2.10 2.30 4.15 4.80
4 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.45 0.35 2.10 2.10 4.65 4.80
5 Nearest Neighbors in Caliper 0.50 0.35 2.40 1.80 5.05 4.60
Conventional Methods
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 2.4 – Continued
Theoretical CDF (%)
0.5 99.5 2.5 97.5 5 95
Control Firm LBT Control Firm 0.10 0.75 1.05 2.90 2.25 6.35
5 Random Control Firms 0.60 0.25 2.40 1.60 5.30 4.00
Ibbotson’s RATS 0.00 9.70 0.00 26.90 0.10 39.90
Calendar Time Portfolios Equal Weghted w/ FF 4-factor 0.00 19.60 0.05 41.25 0.10 54.60
Value Weighted w/ FF 4-factor 0.40 4.80 0.90 15.20 1.95 23.75
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Table 2.5: Repurchase Returns - Fama French Regressions
This table presents estimates of long-run abnormal returns following repurchase announcements
using the RATS method and calendar time (C-Time) equal/value weighted portfolios. Abnormal
returns are calculated starting from the month following the announcement. Panel A includes the
full sample while Panel B considers a subset of the entire sample comprising stocks whose price
was higher than $5 at the end of the month prior to announcement. All returns estimates are in
percentages. The calendar time values are monthly returns. ∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ denote significance levels at
5%, 1%, and 0.1% using a two-tailed test.
12-Months 36-Months 60-Months
Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
Panel A: Full Sample (7,377 Obs.)
RATS 6.9 11.7∗∗∗ 17.5 16.25∗∗∗ 23.6 16.6∗∗∗
C-Time (EW) 0.63 5.72∗∗∗ 0.57 5.93∗∗∗ 0.51 5.75∗∗∗
C-Time (VW) 0.45 4.1∗∗∗ 0.37 4.3∗∗∗ 0.37 4.4∗∗∗
Panel B: Prior Price > $5 (6,663 Obs.)
RATS 5.8 10.8∗∗∗ 15.3 15.1∗∗∗ 21 15.5∗∗∗
C-Time (EW) 0.51 4.6∗∗∗ 0.49 5.1∗∗∗ 0.46 5.2∗∗∗
C-Time (VW) 0.45 4.1∗∗∗ 0.36 4.3∗∗∗ 0.36 4.4∗∗∗
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Table 2.6: Repurchase Returns in Size Deciles - Fama French Regressions
This table presents estimates of long-run abnormal returns following repurchase announcements
using the RATS method and calendar time (C-Time) equal/value weighted portfolios within size
deciles. Panels A, B, and C include firms in size deciles 9–10, 6–8, and 1–5, respectively. Abnormal
returns are calculated starting from the month following the announcement. The sample comprises
stocks whose price was higher than $5 at the end of the month prior to announcement. All returns
estimates are in percentages. The calendar time values are monthly returns. ∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ denote
significance levels at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% using a two-tailed test.
12-Months 36-Months 60-Months
Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
Panel A: Size Deciles 9 – 10 (2,690 Obs.)
RATS 5.8 7.7∗∗∗ 12.2 9∗∗∗ 15.6 8.9∗∗∗
C-Time (EW) 0.55 4.7∗∗∗ 0.47 4.7∗∗∗ 0.47 5∗∗∗
C-Time (VW) 0.45 4∗∗∗ 0.37 4.3∗∗∗ 0.39 4.8∗∗∗
Panel B: Size Deciles 6 – 8 (2,359 Obs.)
RATS 6.8 6.8∗∗∗ 17.7 9.5∗∗∗ 24.1 9.6∗∗∗
C-Time (EW) 0.34 2.1∗ 0.37 2.7∗∗ 0.36 2.7∗∗
C-Time (VW) 0.31 1.98∗ 0.3 2.3∗∗ 0.2 1.6
Panel C: Size Deciles 1 – 5 (1,614 Obs.)
RATS 4.8 4.3∗∗∗ 16.3 7.1∗∗∗ 24.4 7.6∗∗∗
C-Time (EW) 0.23 1.2 0.32 2.1∗∗ 0.26 1.9∗
C-Time (VW) 0.16 0.8 0.18 1.1 0 0.2
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Table 2.7: Repurchase Returns in ROA Deciles - Fama French Regressions
This table presents estimates of long-run abnormal returns following repurchase announcements
using the RATS method and calendar time (C-Time) equal/value weighted portfolios within roa
deciles. Panels A, B, and C include firms in size deciles 9–10, 6–8, and 1–5, respectively. Abnormal
returns are calculated starting from the month following the announcement. The sample comprises
stocks whose price was higher than $5 at the end of the month prior to announcement. All returns
estimates are in percentages. The calendar time values are monthly returns. ∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ denote
significance levels at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% using a two-tailed test.
12-Months 36-Months 60-Months
Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
Panel A: ROA Deciles 9 – 10 (2,041 Obs.)
RATS 8 7.57∗∗∗ 19.4 10.05∗∗∗ 24.3 9.6∗∗∗
C-Time (EW) 0.61 3.96∗∗∗ 0.55 4.33∗∗∗ 0.52 4.39∗∗∗
C-Time (VW) 0.7 3.55∗∗∗ 0.48 3.41∗∗∗ 0.5 3.95∗∗∗
Panel B: ROA Deciles 6 – 8 (2,343 Obs.)
RATS 3.9 4.34∗∗∗ 10 5.98∗∗∗ 16.3 7.29∗∗∗
C-Time (EW) 0.35 2.76∗∗ 0.31 3.11∗∗ 0.33 3.58∗∗∗
C-Time (VW) 0.28 1.86 0.24 2.39∗∗ 0.17 1.79
Panel C: ROA Deciles 1 – 5 (2,279 Obs.)
RATS 5.9 6.8∗∗∗ 17.1 10.15∗∗∗ 23 10.1∗∗∗
C-Time (EW) 0.4 2.85∗∗ 0.48 4.06∗∗∗ 0.44 3.78∗∗∗
C-Time (VW) 0.01 0.51 0.35 2.85∗∗ 0.13 2.66∗∗
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Table 2.8: Repurchase Returns - LBT Control Firm
This table presents estimates of long-run abnormal returns following repurchase announcements using the LBT control firm. Results are shown for
the full sample and the subsample comprising stocks (both repurchasing and control firms) whose price was higher than $5 at the end of the month
prior to announcement. Within this subsample we also calculate abnormal returns within groups of size and ROA deciles. The deciles are grouped in
9–10, 6–8, and 1–5. Abnormal returns are calculated starting from the month following the announcement. All returns estimates are in percentages.
∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ denote significance levels at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% using a two-tailed test.
12-Months 36-Months 60-Months
Est. t-stat Obs. Est. t-stat Obs. Est. t-stat Obs.
Full Sample 3.2 2.82∗∗ 6,339 6.1 1.94 4,690 10.8 2.11∗ 3,598
Price > $5 3.9 3.81∗∗∗ 5,332 5.2 1.88 4,068 10.3 2.17∗ 3,196
Size: 9 – 10 1.8 1.45 2,453 3.5 1.02 2,075 4.7 0.8 1,752
Size: 6 – 8 5.4 2.61∗∗ 1,931 7.3 1.30 1,380 19.9 2.33∗ 1,057
Size: 1 – 5 6.4 2.79∗∗ 946 6.5 0.93 611 9.4 0.55 385
ROA: 9 – 10 6.2 2.97∗∗ 1,726 -1.9 -0.30 1,382 6.9 0.82 1,134
ROA: 6 – 8 1.7 1.08 1,897 3.8 0.94 1,446 7.6 0.89 1,167
ROA: 1 – 5 4.1 2.45∗ 1,707 15 4.11∗∗∗ 1,218 18 2.58∗∗ 893
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Table 2.9: Repurchase Returns – Propensity Score Matching
This table presents estimates of long-run abnormal returns following repurchase announcements using propensity score matching. We initially start
with a caliper of 0.01 standard deviations of the predicted values from the corresponding logistic regression to select our matches from. If this doesn’t
produce any matches, we use an additional caliper of 0.02 standard deviations from which one match is selected. The variables used to calculate
estimated propensity scores are Size, Book-Market, Leverage, Return on Assets, Cash & Cash Equivalents, and Total Asset Turnover and their
squares. Abnormal returns are calculated starting from the month following the announcement. The sample comprises stocks (both repurchasing and
control) whose price was higher than $5 at the end of the month prior to announcement. All returns estimates are in percentages. The calendar time
values are monthly returns. ∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ denote significance levels at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% using a two-tailed test.
12-Months 36-Months 60-Months
Est. t-stat Obs. Est. t-stat Obs. Est. t-stat Obs.
Propensity Score: 1NN 2.2 2.01∗ 5730 7.4 2.97∗∗ 4261 13.7 3.4∗∗∗ 3306
Propensity Score: 2NN 3.1 3.41∗∗∗ 6190 7.4 3.70∗∗∗ 5087 17.4 4.86∗∗∗ 4228
Propensity Score: 3NN 3.3 3.94∗∗∗ 6233 6.6 3.33∗∗∗ 5264 17.7 5.33∗∗∗ 4483
All in Caliper 3.2 4.38∗∗∗ 6235 6.3 3.93∗∗∗ 5320 10.8 3.56∗∗∗ 4610
Mahalanobis Metric: 1NN 2.3 2.32∗ 5761 3.0 1.11 4311 7.9 1.29 3345
Mahalanobis Metric: 2NN 1.7 2.00∗ 6180 4.2 2.00∗ 5090 9.1 2.31∗ 4212
Mahalanobis Metric: 3NN 2.2 2.72∗∗ 6231 4.8 2.54∗ 5260 10.1 2.71∗∗ 4459
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Table 2.10: Repurchase Returns - Propensity Score Matching w/ Mahalanobis Metric
This table presents estimates of long-run abnormal returns following repurchase announcements using propensity score matching with Mahalanobis
metric. We initially start with a caliper of 0.01 standard deviations of the predicted values from the corresponding logistic regression to select our
matches from. If this doesn’t produce any matches, we use an additional caliper of 0.02 standard deviations from which one match is selected. The
variables used to calculate estimated propensity scores are Size, Book-Market, Leverage, Return on Assets, Cash & Cash Equivalents, and Total
Asset Turnover and their squares. Abnormal returns are calculated starting from the month following the announcement. The sample comprises
stocks (both repurchasing and control) whose price was higher than $5 at the end of the month prior to announcement. All returns estimates are in
percentages. The calendar time values are monthly returns. ∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ denote significance levels at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% using a two-tailed test.
12-Months 36-Months 60-Months
Neighbors Est. t-stat Obs. Est. t-stat Obs. Est. t-stat Obs.
1 2.3 2.32∗ 5761 3.0 1.11 4311 7.9 1.29 3345
2 1.7 2.00∗ 6180 4.2 2.00∗ 5090 9.1 2.31∗ 4212
3 2.2 2.72∗∗ 6231 4.8 2.54∗ 5260 10.1 2.71∗∗ 4459
4 2.4 3.07∗∗ 6235 4.8 2.64∗∗ 5302 9.8 2.52∗ 4538
5 2.3 3.03∗∗ 6235 4.5 2.59∗∗ 5314 10.0 2.66∗∗ 4581
6 2.2 3.01∗∗ 6235 4.7 2.76∗∗ 5319 9.0 2.50∗ 4602
7 2.3 3.15∗∗ 6235 5.0 2.98∗∗ 5320 9.6 2.83∗∗ 4606
8 2.3 3.11∗∗ 6235 5.0 3.02∗∗ 5320 10.1 3.05∗∗ 4609
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 2.10 – Continued
12-Months 36-Months 60-Months
Est. t-stat Obs. Est. t-stat Obs. Est. t-stat Obs.
9 2.5 3.36∗∗∗ 6235 5.2 3.14∗∗ 5320 8.9 2.58∗∗ 4610
10 2.6 3.51∗∗∗ 6235 5.3 3.24∗∗ 5320 9.0 2.67∗∗ 4610
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Table 2.11: Mahalanobis Metric Returns - Size & ROA Deciles
This table presents estimates of long-run abnormal returns following repurchase announcements using propensity score matching with Mahalanobis
metric within groups of size and ROA deciles. We initially start with a caliper of 0.01 standard deviations of the predicted values from the corresponding
logistic regression to select our matches from. If this doesn’t produce any matches, we use an additional caliper of 0.02 standard deviations from
which one match is selected. The variables used to calculate estimated propensity scores are Size, Book-Market, Leverage, Return on Assets, Cash &
Cash Equivalents, and Total Asset Turnover and their squares. Abnormal returns are calculated starting from the month following the announcement.
The sample comprises stocks (both repurchasing and control) whose price was higher than $5 at the end of the month prior to announcement. All
returns estimates are in percentages. The calendar time values are monthly returns. ∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ denote significance levels at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% using
a two-tailed test.
12-Months 36-Months 60-Months
Est. t-stat Obs. Est. t-stat Obs. Est. t-stat Obs.
Size: 9 – 10 1.2 1.11 2461 3.7 1.55 2221 3.2 0.74 1981
Size: 6 – 8 3.1 2.01∗ 2240 2.9 0.87 1865 13.8 1.87 1597
Size: 1 – 5 2.4 1.53 1528 10.0 2.03∗ 1172 18.8 2.09∗ 879
ROA: 9 – 10 2.1 1.16 1896 -0.1 -0.02 1679 0.0 0.00 1483
ROA: 6 – 8 1.4 1.13 2197 4.5 1.36 1884 13.6 2.35∗ 1639
ROA: 1 – 5 3.0 2.76∗∗ 2136 10.1 3.61∗∗∗ 1695 17.0 3.39∗∗∗ 1335
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Figure 2.1: Predicted Probability by Decile
This figure shows the predicted probabilities obtained from the logistic regression for repurchase
decisions plotted by deciles of the independent variables shown. The horizontal axis shows the
decile values. The vertical axis shows the predicted probabilities. For each variable-decile value, we
plot the predicted probabilities based on the mean values of all the independent variables in that
variable-decile. The horizontal line in the middle shows the baseline probability, i.e. the predicted
probability for a firm with all its variables at 0. The bold line shows the predicted probabilities
according to decile breakpoints of Vnet.






























Figure 2.2: Repurchasing & Control Firm(s): Size Difference
We calulate the difference between the size of repurchasing firms and their matched control firm(s)
for each firm announcing a repurchase. This figure shows the distribution of the difference using
various methods. The horizontal axis shows the percentile while the vertical axis shows the difference































Figure 2.3: Repurchasing & Control Firm(s): Book Market Difference
We calulate the difference between the book market of repurchasing firms and their matched control
firm(s) for each firm announcing a repurchase. This figure shows the distribution of the difference
using various methods. The horizontal axis shows the percentile while the vertical axis shows the


























Figure 2.4: Repurchasing & Control Firm(s): Leverage Difference
We calulate the difference between the leverage of repurchasing firms and their matched control
firm(s) for each firm announcing a repurchase. This figure shows the distribution of the difference
using various methods. The horizontal axis shows the percentile while the vertical axis shows the
























Figure 2.5: Repurchasing & Control Firm(s): ROA Difference
We calulate the difference between the ROA of repurchasing firms and their matched control firm(s)
for each firm announcing a repurchase. This figure shows the distribution of the difference using
various methods. The horizontal axis shows the percentile while the vertical axis shows the difference




























Figure 2.6: Repurchasing & Control Firm(s): Cash Difference
We calulate the difference between the cash & cash equivalents of repurchasing firms and their
matched control firm(s) for each firm announcing a repurchase. This figure shows the distribution
of the difference using various methods. The horizontal axis shows the percentile while the vertical
























Figure 2.7: Repurchasing & Control Firm(s): TAT Difference
We calulate the difference between the tat of repurchasing firms and their matched control firm(s)
for each firm announcing a repurchase. This figure shows the distribution of the difference using
various methods. The horizontal axis shows the percentile while the vertical axis shows the difference
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